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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an examination of the historical developments of vicarious 
liability law in the English legal system over the past 200 years. The developments 
considered date from the principles laid down in Joel v Morison [1834] EWHC KB 
J39 to the most recent case of Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2017] IRLR 
124. The various tests for employment status and the course of employment are 
discussed, with speciﬁc analysis into why the tests have changed and developed. 
Case law and academic criticism is presented to emphasise how the changes have 
had a positive or negative impact on the clarity and fairness of the area of law. 
The main focus of the piece is based upon the decisions of A M Mohamud v WM 
Morrison Supermarkets Plc [2016] UKSC 11 and Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] 
UKSC 10. Speciﬁcally, how they have changed the principles of vicarious liability and 
what principles they have conﬁrmed to be correct. The decisions of these two cases 
may be seen as some of the most unexpected decisions in vicarious liability to date. 
This piece assesses if those decisions are the correct ones and what this will mean 
for future decisions. 
This topic was chosen due to the recent developments in vicarious liability law, 
created by cases heard in recent years. Critics such as Neyers have questioned the 
justiﬁcations for the imposition of vicarious liability and its mere existence could be 
argued to be both fair and unfair. It is therefore proposed that it is important that we 
review its justiﬁcation, especially during times of change such as these. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This thesis provides a detailed explanation of the history of the law of vicarious 
liability in the United Kingdom, including its application in recent cases including Mr A 
M Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc.  It also critically analyses how the 1
application of vicarious liability precedents may have led to unjust decisions. The 
enquiry will address whether the case of Mohamud was wrongfully decided and, if 
so, what implications this has for the future of vicarious liability and the parties to 
such a claim.
As the ﬁrst chapter in this study will focus on the history of vicarious liability law in 
the UK, the research will trace the development of this legal doctrine from early 
cases such as Joel v Morison  to those being decided now. As will be shown, as the 2
nature of the relationship between employer and employee has changed, so too 
have the tests to determine if an employer is liable for the tort committed by their 
employee. The research will explore the ‘broad risk’ principle from Hamlyn v 
Houston , where the law stands with independent contractors (Honeywill v Larkin ), 3 4
the Salmond test  and others. The ﬁrst chapter will discuss the three elements that 5
need to be proven by the claimant; those being that a tort/offence has been 
committed, that it was committed by an employee and in the course of employment. 
The ﬁrst two elements will not be discussed in great detail as there would be a risk of 
straying too much into criminal and employment law (the focus of this piece is tort 
law). The third element will be discussed in much greater detail, with focus on cases 
such as Lister v Hesley Hall  which really changed the way in which the courts 6
perceived ‘course of employment’ – rather than consider whether the employer 
allowed employees to carry out similar acts, the Court instead started to consider 
 [2016] UKSC 111
 (1834) 6 C&P 501, [1834] EWHC KB J392
 [1903] 1 KB 813
 [1934] 1 KB 1914
 Heuston, R. & Buckley, R., Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 5
1996)
 [2001] UKHL 226
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whether the job offered the employee the opportunity to do such things. This 
research will also discuss the impact that Lister had on cases which followed: as 
shall be demonstrated, some judges accepted the change, whereas others 
questioned it. For example, where Giliker questions the Lords’ lack of consistency 
when creating the ‘close connection’ test , Lord Dyson openly supports it in 7
Mohamud .8
Once the history of vicarious liability has been discussed, with particular focus on the 
‘course of employment’, the thesis continues by discussing the recent case of 
Mohamud in the second chapter. With the use of relevant pre-existing research, the 
case is analysed to discover what the decisions mean for the present and future of 
the doctrine of vicarious liability law and the changes it represents. At this point the 
recent case of Cox v Ministry of Justice  is critiqued in conjunction with Mohamud in 9
this comparative doctrinal analysis.  
The importance of vicarious liability lies in the fact that the recent Mohamud case 
has brought into question whether the tests and precedents used over hundreds of 
years to determine if an employer is vicariously liable are in fact just. If the Mohamud 
case could set a new precedent for deciding if an employer is liable then this could 
render all previous tests, and all previous decisions, obsolete. Could that then mean 
that employers would need to change the way in which they select and train new 
employees? 
As Mohamud and Cox are relatively recent cases, the range of sources available to 
research is slim. However, by comparing the available research with the countless 
sources on vicarious liability prior to the decisions of the two cases, the thesis 
provides an assessment as to whether the correct way of determining the employer’s 
vicarious liability is the traditional way or the new way. There may even exist a third 
way which has yet to be used by the courts. Once this has been completed, a 
 Giliker, ‘Lister revisited: Vicarious Liability, distributive justice and the course of 7
employment’ (2010) LQR 521, 523
 [2016] UKSC 118
 [2016] UKSC 109
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prediction can be made as to the future of vicarious liability; how will/should future 
cases be decided?
Previous research has indicated that it is already possible to assess how the future 
of vicarious liability will look. Per Lord Oliver in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman , ‘ I 10
think that it has to be recognised that to search for any single formula which will 
serve as a general test of liability is to pursue a will-o'-the wisp’ . The fact that this 11
quote was made 60 years ago, and the judiciary’s continuing confusion, indicates 
that questions will continue to be raised as to the justness of the law in cases such 
as these will continue to be raised, as they were in Mohamud. 
 [1990] 2 A.C. 60510
 Caparo, 63311
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1.1. METHODOLOGY
This thesis aims to analyse the historical developments of vicarious liability law and 
investigates what the future of the doctrine may look like following signiﬁcant 
developments in recent case authority. The research undertaken is secondary and 
contains no empirical research. Rather, existing research materials are analysed and 
compared in answering the question asked of this thesis. Research was undertaken 
in various different formats, including primary materials such as case reports, and 
secondary sources such as journal articles, texts and existing doctrinal research. 
Key case authority, which previously held the greatest importance, have been 
analysed using academic commentary in articles to assess opinion and to develop 
an understanding of the scale of impact the cases have had on the law.
The starting point for the research was an overview of the law and legal tests 
required to substantiate the holding of a principal vicariously liable for the torts of 
another. It then developed to exploration of key cases, with examination of the 
existing academic criticisms of the decisions. Additional research was undertaken 
into recommendations from the authors of the journal articles used or cases which 
were used in the decisions of the initial cases of interest. Comparison was also made 
between articles discussing the same topic or case but at different times. For 
example, comparisons were made between opinions of academics on the Lister 
‘close connection’ test from the time it was created and those made now. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
LAW IN THE UK LEADING UP TO 2016
Vicarious liability law, in reality, dates back to medieval times . However, the main 12
developments considered in this research will be over the past 200 years. This 
chapter aims to provide a detailed recap of those developments; expressing their 
importance and criticising their effectiveness. The chapter is structured into three 
parts: the requirement of a tort/offence being committed, the various tests used to 
determine both employment status and the course of employment, but the heaviest 
weighting will be given to the course of employment as this is the area which has 
caused the most disputes and has been subject to recent and signiﬁcant change.
However, before assessment of the test establishing the vicarious liability of a 
principal is considered, it is worth explaining the justiﬁcation of the doctrine, which 
has been described as one of ‘rough justice and social convenience.’
2.1. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
As Neyers  points out, there are various justiﬁcations for the imposition of vicarious 13
liability. The original justiﬁcation is control – the employer controls the employee’s 
activities and, hence, should be liable for their tort. However, Atiyah noted:
‘control cannot be treated as either a sufﬁcient reason for always imposing 
liability, or as a necessary reason without which there should never be 
vicarious liability. Control has never per se been a ground for imposing 
vicarious liability, e.g., a parent is not liable for the torts of his children, a 
superior servant is not liable for the torts of subordinate servants, 
schoolteachers are not liable for the torts of their pupils and so forth. 
Conversely the absence of control — although at one time thought to preclude 
 Mohamud, [11] as per Lord Touloson12
 J. W. Neyers, ‘A theory of vicarious liability’ (2005-6) 43 Alberta Law Review 28713
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vicarious liability in the case of skilled and professional servants — is today 
not a serious obstacle to such liability.’14
Therefore, the control argument is inadequate. 
The second possible justiﬁcation is compensation/deeper pockets  - the employer 15
will, in most cases, be more able to afford the compensation costs. However, there 
are three main reasons why this explanation is not adequate – 1) it does not explain 
why the employer speciﬁcally would be the best person to compensate the victim – 
they could be adequately compensated by another source, 2) it does not allow for a 
distinction between employees and independent contractors. Here we may look to 
Flannigan, who stated that ‘generally speaking, an employer will be richer... than the 
workers he employs, whether they are servants or independent contractors. That 
being so... no distinction ought to be made between servants and independent 
contractors for the purposes of vicarious liability.’  The ﬁnal reason is 3) it doesn’t 16
explain the two elements that a tort must have been committed by an employee and 
in the course of employment. Therefore, this argument, too, is not adequate. 
The third justiﬁcation is deterrence – this comes in two forms – employer and 
employee deterrence. Under employer deterrence the law is justiﬁed by making the 
employer liable in the name of reducing accidents. However, this theory negates the 
‘vicarious’ aspect of vicarious liability and does not explain the need for an employer/
employee relationship. However, in Bazley it was said that:
‘[b]eyond the narrow band of employer conduct that attracts direct liability in 
negligence lies a vast area where imaginative and efﬁcient administration and 
supervision can reduce the risk that the employer has introduced into the 
community. Holding the employer vicariously liable for the wrongs of its 
 P.S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (London: Butterworths, 1967), 1614
 See Limpus v. London General Omnibus Company (1862), 158 E.R. 993 at 998 15
 Flannigan, R., “Enterprise Control: The Servant-Independent Contractor 16
Distinction” (1987) 37 U.T.L.J. 25, 28  
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employee may encourage the employer to take such steps, and hence, 
reduce the risk of future harm.’17
Employee deterrence is based upon the idea that they rarely have wealth and may 
not be identiﬁable in some cases. However, this theory rarely holds up as the 
employers can make the changes themselves and this does not work if the act is 
already a crime – ‘If the criminal law will not deter the wrongdoer there seems little 
deterrent value in holding the employer of the offender liable in damages for the 
assault committed.’  18
The fourth justiﬁcation is loss-distribution, where by an employer can spread the cost 
of compensation between insurers and customers . Although, this theory does not 19
explain the imposition of vicarious liability where costs cannot be spread – such as 
with charities. We must ask with this justiﬁcation; why can the costs not be spread 
through the government or a scheme of social insurance? This justiﬁcation could 
also include independent contractors, which we know vicarious liability does not do, 
and it does not explain the need for a tort to be committed, as well as in the course 
of employment. 
The ﬁfth justiﬁcation is enterprise liability, as was brought up in Mohamud. The ﬁrst 
justiﬁcation for enterprise liability is, essentially, the beneﬁt and burden principle. The 
second is the creation/exasperation of risk by the employer. However, enterprise 
liability does not explain when charities are found liable, it does not explain the 
requirement that an individual is an employee and that the compensatory amount is 
unlimited. 
The ﬁnal justiﬁcation is all of the previous justiﬁcations – mixed policy. However, this 
justiﬁcation is questionable as some of the rationales are inconsistent and many of 
the elements are still difﬁcult to explain. Therefore, even though there are several 
 Bazley v. Curry [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, [33]17
 New South Wales v Lepore (2003), 195 A.L.R. 412, [2003] HCA 4, at 21918
 Escola v Coca-Cola Bottle Co 150 P.2d 436 at 441 (Cal. 1944) 19
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justiﬁcations for the imposition of vicarious liability, none are ﬂawless and all lead to, 
arguably, more questions than they answer. 
Having outlined the justiﬁcation for the continued presence of the doctrine in English 
law, we return to the question as to the tests that must be satisﬁed to establish the 
potential liability of the principal.
One of the earliest inﬂuential cases in vicarious liability is the case of Dyer v 
Munday . In this case, Lord Esher summarised vicarious liability in the following 20
way: ‘if, in course of carrying out his employment, the servant commits an excess 
beyond the scope of his authority, the master is liable’ . This may appear to be a 21
relatively outdated statement, however, its basis is still very much relevant to English 
tort law in 2017. 
Previous case authority was based on the relationship between masters and their 
servants. These are not the same as the current incarnations of employers and 
employees, but it is interesting to note how the law operated in the formation of the 
doctrine – i.e. in the 18-1900s. In 1922, Dyer, in commenting on masters and 
servants , made reference to Dunn v Reeves Coal Yards Co. , in which a coal mine 22 23
owner employed someone to transport the coal, the driver subsequently ran over the 
claimant’s son and the claim for recovery against the mine owner employer was 
allowed. At that time, the general view was that, if an individual was paid for their 
work or materials which they provided, they were an independent contractor, and if 
not an independent contractor then they were a servant . There were, however, 24
occasions when an individual could be paid and still be classed as a servant . 25
Clearly, this is no longer the view in today’s society. However, many of the historical 
 [1895] 1 QB 74220
 Dyer, 74621
 Unknown author, ‘Masters and Servant. Injuries to third parties. Employee servant or 22
independent contractor’ (1922) 8(5) Virginia Law Review 381 
 (Minn.), 184 N.W. 1027 (1921)23
 Giacamini v Paciﬁc Lumber Co. 5 Cal. App. 218, 89 Pac. 1059 (1907)24
 Tifﬁn v McCormack, supra; Isnard v Edgar Zinc. Co., 81 Kan. 765, 106 Pac. 1003 (1910)25
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tests created still hold strong. Independent contractors are those who are in business 
of their own accord – they pay their own tax and national insurance and are 
responsible for themselves. They are deemed to carry their own insurance and 
therefore an individual who hires them (as temporary employer) will not be 
vicariously liable for their torts. 
In any vicarious liability case, there is a tripartite test to establish liability, these are: 
1) a tort or offence has been committed, 2) the tort/offence was committed by an 
employee, and 3) the tort/offence was committed in the course of the employee’s 
employment. 
Each of these elements shall be discussed individually with reference to relevant 
case law and, where relevant, statute. The third element is the most important as it 
has been the cause of the greatest contradiction in case law and hence shall be 
discussed in greater detail than the ﬁrst two. The course of employment discussion is 
one that is central to this thesis, however, to get to the point of that discussion we 
must ﬁrst look at the other two elements. 
2.2. REQUIREMENT ONE - TORT/OFFENCE COMMITTED BY AN 
EMPLOYEE
The ﬁrst element which the claimant must prove to establish vicarious liability is that 
a tort or offence has been committed. This criterion was discussed in the case of 
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell  where two brothers, certiﬁed shot ﬁrers 26
employed by ICI, were injured due to their own negligence. One of the brothers 
brought a vicarious liability claim against their employer for the injuries caused by the 
other brother. This claim failed in the Court of Appeal as the brothers were under a 
statutory duty to only test the circuit if they had sufﬁcient wire to be sheltered at a 
safe distance under regulation 27(4) of the Quarries (Explosives) Regulations 1959. 
The brothers were held to have accepted the risk of injury and therefore were held to 
be responsible for their own injuries. The criterion requiring a tort/offence to be 
 [1965] AC 65626
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committed was raised in this case as the brothers were personally under a statutory 
duty and, in breaching that duty, an offence was committed.
The ﬁrst criterion required to establish vicariously liability is arguably the easiest to 
establish. The second and third elements may be considerably more difﬁcult to 
prove. Employment status is a continually evolving and dynamic concept (for 
instance the concept of ‘worker’, an EU-based construct, may end following the UK’s 
withdrawal from the European Union) and is subject to many external vitiating 
factors. 
2.3. REQUIREMENT TWO - TESTS FOR EMPLOYMENT STATUS
This test shall begin by deﬁning the difference between a contract of services and a 
contract for services. A contract for services is one held between an employer and an 
independent contractor. As will be shown, this type of contract will not be one that 
brings vicarious liability. A contact of services is one held between an employer and 
an employee. In earlier cases, where the relationship between the employer and 
employee was questioned, the courts used a test of control. In the case of Yewens v 
Noakes,  Bramwell LJ stated that ‘a servant is a person who is subject to the 27
command of his master as to the manner in which he shall do his work’ . The focus, 28
when considering how much control the employer has, is on what type of work the 
employer has asked for and if they have speciﬁed how it is to be done. If harm 
ensues, and the employer was found to have sufﬁcient control, the courts will 
generally ﬁnd the employer to be the causal link and therefore vicariously liable. The 
‘control test’ was also considered in Honeywill v Larkin , in relation to independent 29
contractors, in which Slesser LJ emphasised that:
‘It is well established as a general rule of English law that an employer is not 
liable for the acts of his independent contractor in the same way as he is for 
 (1881) 6 QBD 53027
 Yewens (n17), 53228
 [1934] 1 KB 19129
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the acts of his servants or agents, even though these acts are done in 
carrying out the work for his beneﬁt under the contract’ . 30
However, as many trades have become more specialised, this control test has 
ceased to be used in isolation, yet it continues to be an aspect of the leading 
authority on establishing employment status. Many employers do not necessarily 
have the skills to instruct an employee on how to do their job. Lord Reed 
summarised this effectively in Cox v Ministry of Justice  by stating that the control 31
test would not be appropriate ‘if one thinks for example of the degree of control 
which the owner of a ship could have exercised over the master while the ship was 
at sea’ .32
Not only has the relationship between employer and employee changed to make the 
(isolated) control test irrelevant, the nature of modern employees has also changed. 
Mackay  discusses ‘temporary’ employees and refers to them as ‘gig workers’. He 33
uses Uber drivers as an example of these particular workers. In the modern 
economy, these forms of worker are growing drastically in size, but where do they 
stand in the worker/employee argument? This point was raised back in 1990 by 
McKendrick , and referred to in the English Province case , where he remarked: 34 35
‘The labour market in Britain is presently undergoing signiﬁcant structural 
change. The principal change is a rapid increase in new, ﬂexible forms and 
patterns of work which depart radically from the standard employment 
 Honeywill (n19), 19630
 [2016] UKSC 1031
 Cox (n21), 2132
 Mackay, N., ‘Vicarious Liability: There’s an app for that’ (2016) J.P.I.L 90, 9333
 McKendrick, E., ‘Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-34
examination’ (1990) 53 M.L.R. 770
 E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and Another [2013] Q.B. 72235
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relationship whereby an employee works regularly (that is, full-time) and 
consistently for his employer under a contract of employment.’  36
This statement is reﬂected in the creation of temporary jobs, such as Uber drivers 
who work as few or many hours as they wish, and one-off handy men who can work 
for as little as one hour once a year to a regular forty-hour week.  Mckendrick 37
continues:
‘The primary signiﬁcance for tort lawyers lies in the fact that, owing to the 
ﬂexibility, lack of continuity and irregularity of their work, many atypical 
workers are either unable or have great difﬁculty in establishing that they are 
employees employed under a contract of employment. If they are not 
employees then, presumably, they are outside the scope of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability.’  38
Does this mean that there should be no way for the victims to receive compensation 
as those in cases involving an employee would?
McKendrick concludes by asking ‘Can the doctrine of vicarious liability be adapted in 
order to encompass this new workforce or will the courts have to create new forms of 
primary liability?’  39
Ward J, in considering McKendrick’s statements made in 1990, stated:
‘To distil it to a single sentence I would say that an employee is one who is 
paid a wage or salary to work under some, if only slight, control of his 
employer in his employer’s business for his employer’s business. The 
 McKendrick, E., ‘Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-36
examination’ (1990) 53 M.L.R. 770, 770 
 Mackay, 9037
 McKendrick, E., ‘Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-38
examination’ (1990) 53 M.L.R. 770, 770
 McKendrick, E., ‘Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-39
examination’ (1990) 53 M.L.R. 770, 770
"15
independent contractor works in and for his own business at his risk of proﬁt 
or loss.’40
It would therefore seem that independent contractors should be subject to different 
legal principles than employees as they cannot ﬁt in with the usual tests. An 
independent contractor who is in business on their own accord should hold adequate 
liability insurance , hence bypassing vicarious liability. When the incident is 41
‘bypassed’ it means that the victim will have a direct claim of action against the 
independent contractor, not the person for whom they are working. In the past this 
was not a problem, however, as Mackay says, being an independent contractor or a 
worker instead of an employee is becoming increasingly fashionable today . These 42
individuals may assume that they are employees and therefore may not have the 
proper insurance for themselves or even be aware that they need it. 
Commenting on this issue, Lockwood stated:
‘The concept of vicarious liability developed during a period in which the 
distinction between employee and self-employed was obvious and clear. Over 
the last few decades, however, patterns of employment, occupation and 
business structures have changed to an unprecedented degree, with a large 
part of the adult-working population becoming increasingly involved in part-
time, temporary or casual employment engagements. At the same juncture a 
competitive business environment has resulted in many employing 
organisations taking measures to reduce their labour costs. This has led to 
the growth of employment situations where it has become difﬁcult to ascertain 
the precise nature of the employment relationship. This has given rise to an 
array of legal disputes on the issue over the last 40 years…’43
 E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and Another [2013] Q.B. 722, [70]40
 McKendrick, 78141
 MacKay, 9042
 Lockwood, G., ‘The Widening of Vicarious Liability: Implications for Employers’ [2011] Int. 43
J.L.M. 149, 151
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This reiterates how the relationship between employer and employee, and hence the 
level of control, has changed over time to make control as a singular test almost 
obsolete. The tests have evolved from control, in isolation, to the right to control test. 
Lord Denning then developed the organization/integration test before the mixed test 
was established in Ready Mixed Concrete. Further still, the economic reality and 
‘business on own account’ tests have been used in an attempt to provide certainty to 
this crucial issue. Yet only in the sphere of taxation has the test been established 
which (somewhat harshly) identiﬁes with clarity an employee from the genuinely self-
employed independent contractor.  This links to vicarious liability as it illustrates how 44
the tests must change with time, as employment status has done. Any future tests 
must incorporate both the modern employment situations, along with the age-old 
ones. 
Hence, many different tests for employment status have been developed by the 
courts to establish if a contract is of service (employee) or for services (independent 
contractor). Many of these tests focus on whether the employer dictated where and 
when the work was to be done and with what tools. The tests also consider different 
contractual and external factors. Lord Cooke stipulated in Market Investigations Ltd v 
Minister of Social Security  that, where a person is in business on their own 45
account, it is a contract for services, otherwise it is a contract of services. This 
principle was subsequently cited in the case of Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung  46
by the Privy Council – the factors considered included risk of loss and chance of 
proﬁt.
In Cassidy v Ministry of Health , Denning LJ proposed a test based on the extent of 47
integration of an individual into a business or organization. The test was also used by 
Denning LJ in Stephenson, Jordan & Harrison v MacDonald & Evans . He stated 48
 See Marson, J. 'Anatomy of an Employee' (2013) 19(3) Web JCLI.44
 [1969] 2 QB 17345
 [1990] LRC (Comm) 61146
 [1951] 2 KB 34347
 (1952) 1 TLR 10148
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that ‘It is often easy to recognise a contract of service when you see it, but difﬁcult to 
see where the difference lies’ . This test looks into how the individual was literally 49
‘made part’ of the group of employees working for the employer. It considers whether 
they used the lunch room and if they were included as one of the group – put in 
basic terms, would they appear to have unquestionable employment status (they are 
an employee, not a worker) from a layman’s perspective? The integration test clearly 
appeared to be the correct one to Denning LJ in these two cases as it looked not at 
the contract in hand, but how the employer treated the individual, along with the 
other staff. If it looked like they were an employee, then they most likely were. 
However, it was only brieﬂy popular with the courts as determining ‘integration’, 
which Denning failed to deﬁne in the case, led to conjecture as to its meaning and its 
suitability as authority for future cases. A different test very quickly took favour with 
the judges – the ‘economic reality’ test. 
Although all of these tests have their advantages and disadvantages, the test used 
most in cases now is the ‘mixed’ or ‘economic reality’ test, established in the case of 
Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions  by McKenna J. This test asks three 50
questions to establish if the individual in question is an employee or an independent 
contractor:
1) Is the individual subject to a level of control by the employer to make the latter 
his master? – this is taken from the control test previously discussed.
2) Did the individual provide a personal service in return for remuneration?
3) Are the provisions of the contract consistent with a contract of service?
If all three of these criteria are satisﬁed, then the individual will be found to be an 
employee. This test was subsequently cited in the case of Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd 
v Gardiner And Another  in which Stephenson LJ commented: 51
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‘There must, in my judgment, be an irreducible minimum of obligation on each 
side to create a contract of service. I doubt if it can be reduced any lower than 
in the sentences I have just quoted and I have doubted whether even that 
minimum can be discerned to be present in the facts as found by the industrial 
tribunal…’52
There has been a considerable debate on the issue of mutuality of obligations and 
the signiﬁcance placed on it in employment law. As it is not exclusive to the 
employment relationships, it is often criticised as holding too much signiﬁcance. We 
may consider Montgomery v Johnson Underwood  to be a leading authority in this 53
ﬁeld, in which an individual was claiming unfair dismissal – they had been employed 
by an agency on a long term placement. The court held that a tribunal should strictly 
follow the established tests for employment, especially those of control. Buckley J 
stated that what is required is ‘an irreducible minimum of obligation on each side to 
create a contract of services’ . He stressed that the correct test was that of Ready 54
Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions – ‘mutuality of obligation’, control and 
consistency of contract. Buckley J added:
‘In many cases the employer or controlling management may have no more 
than a very general idea of how the work is done and no inclination directly to 
interfere with it. However, some sufﬁcient framework of control must surely 
exist. A contractual relationship concerning work to be carried out in which the 
one party has no control over the other could not sensibly be called a contract 
of employment.’55
The court found that there were three elements required for a contract of services to 
exist: 1) Mutuality of obligations – skills in exchange for remuneration; 2) the 
individual had agreed to be subject to a sufﬁcient degree of control; and 3) the 
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remaining provisions of the contract are consistent with that of a contact of services. 
These are essentially the same as those in Ready Mixed Concrete. Justice Buckley 
also held:
‘A contractual relationship concerning work to be carried out in which the one 
party has no control over the other could not sensibly be called a contract of 
employment. MacKenna J cited a passage from the judgment of Dixon J 
in Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 389 from which I take 
the ﬁrst few lines only:
“The question is not whether in practice the work was in fact done 
subject to a direction and control exercised by any actual supervision 
or whether any actual supervision was possible but whether ultimate 
authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the 
employer so that he was subject to the latter's order and directions.”.’  56
Although the general rule is that an employee must be under a contract of service for 
their employer to be vicariously liable, exceptionally an employer may also be liable 
for the torts of an independent contractor. There are generally three situations in 
which the employer will be so liable: 
1) If the employer has commissioned the tort, this will render the employer a 
‘joint tortfeasor’.
2) If the employer was negligent in selecting a competent contractor .57
3) If a non-delegable duty was imposed on the employer, either by statute or 
common law (the common law would impose this duty if the activity was 
particularly hazardous and if there was a risk of damage) . 58
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An employer may also be liable for the torts of a temporary employee, loaned from 
another employer and, ‘in a situation where a “general” employer provides an 
employee to a “temporary” employer, it is for the general employer to show that it is 
not vicariously liable, and the burden is a heavy one’ . Situations such as this were 59
discussed by Lord Justices May and Rix in Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal 
Transfer Northern Ltd  in which ﬁve factors were discussed to establish if there 60
should be dual liability imposed on the employers. Those factors are: 
‘(1) The general employer has the signiﬁcant burden of establishing that it does not 
retain all responsibility for the employee's actions. 
(2) Who engaged the negligent employee and who paid him or her? Who has the 
power to dismiss him or her?...
(3) Who exercises the immediate direction and control of the relevant work? Who is 
entitled to tell the employee how they are to carry out the work on which they are 
engaged? 
(4) When investigating the facts of a particular case, the court should concentrate on 
the relevant negligent act, and then ask who carries the responsibility for preventing 
it. 
(5) Vicarious responsibility should rest with the employer in whose actions some 
degree of fault, though remote, may be found.’61
As can be seen from this, where there are two employers, the consideration reverts 
back to control – who had more control over the employee? Who was responsible for 
the tort? If it is both, then then dual liability should be imposed. In most cases 
concerning vicarious liability, there is only one employer concerned, hence there is 
not a much discussion on dual liability. However, the debate concerning the 
distinction between an employee and an independent contractor is one that is likely 
to continue for a very long time. As trades become much more specialised and 
 Lockwood, G., ‘The Widening of Vicarious Liability: Implications for Employers’ [2011] Int. 59
J.L.M. 149, 151
 [2005] IRLR 98360
 Lockwood, G., ‘The Widening of Vicarious Liability: Implications for Employers’ [2011] Int. 61
J.L.M. 149, 152
"21
developed, the knowledge gap between employer and employee will continue to 
grow and hence tests such as the “economic reality” test will become increasingly 
important in the consideration of the courts.
2.4. REQUIREMENT THREE – TESTS OF ‘COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT’
The ﬁnal element to be proven by the claimant, that the employee was acting in the 
course of their employment when committing the tort, is the most important element 
for consideration and hence is discussed in detail. Prior to the Salmond test , which 62
shall be discussed later, vicarious liability was based on the view that the master 
should be liable for the torts of their servant – Dyer v Munday . There is, however, 63
mention of the course of employment dating back before 1834. In the case of Joel v 
Morison , Parke B stated:64
‘The master is only liable where the servant is acting in the course of his 
employment. If he was going out of his way, against his master's implied 
commands, when driving on his master's business, he will make his master 
liable; but if he was going on a frolic of his own, without being at all on his 
master's business, the master will not be liable.’65
When it is considered that this case is almost 200 years old, it illustrates that, even 
though vicarious liability law has developed substantially through the years, as shall 
be seen, it is still based on these basic foundations. Notably, in Kooragang 
Investments Pty Ltd v Richardson Ltd , a 1981 case, Lord Wilberforce said:66
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‘The underlying principle remains that a servant, even while performing acts of 
the class which he was authorised, or employed, to do, may so clearly depart 
from the scope of his employment that his master will not be liable for his 
wrongful acts.’67
There is much similarity between these two statements which suggests that the 
courts adhere to narrow guidelines on the course of employment – changing only 
certain surrounding factors to make the law easier to interpret. When we consider 
the ‘economic reality test’ we see that it holds much similarity to the ‘control test’, 
with only minor elements changed it maintains the ideas held for years, and yet 
adapts to modern views and employment situations. 
Two very similar cases, decided prior to the Salmond test, are Limpus v London 
General Omnibus Co  and Beard v London General Omnibus . In Limpus, the facts 68 69
concerned bus drivers working for the defendant who were racing to get to bus stops 
and deliberately obstructing each other. The case arose when an injury ensued from 
the drivers’ reckless behaviour. The employer was found liable in this case as, 
although the drivers were not authorised to do this, they were authorised to drive 
buses. Hence they committed an authorised task in an unauthorised way. These 
facts can be compared to those in Beard, in which a bus conductor was driving a bus 
and injured someone. The employer was not found liable in this case as it could not 
be said that the conductor was employed to drive a bus at all. The unauthorised 
nature of the task went beyond the scope of the employer’s vicarious liability. 
Although these two cases were decided before the Salmond test, they illustrate the 
application of the test in practice. 
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An employer will be liable under the Salmond test if the employee has performed 
‘either (a) a wrongful act authorised by the master, or (b) a wrongful and 
unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master’ . 70
The ﬁrst part of this test is relatively easy to apply, however, the second part can be 
much more problematic, especially if the wrongful act committed by the employee is 
intentional . 71
Before the Salmond test, cases such as Bayley v Manchester, Shefﬁeld and 
Lincolnshire Railway Co  were still decided in the same way. In this case, a train 72
conductor threw a passenger from a train, assuming that he was on the wrong train. 
The employer was found liable in this case because the court held such action as an 
unauthorised way of completing an authorised act. In Century Insurance v Northern 
Ireland Road Transport Board , the employee, a driver of petrol trucks, was found to 73
be in the course of employment when he discarded a lit cigarette at a petrol station 
and caused a ﬁre. In Twine v Bean’s Express Ltd , a driver for the post ofﬁce was 74
not held to be in the course of employment because, when he gave a lift to the 
claimant, he was doing something that was expressly prohibited – as Lord Greene 
said the ‘thing which he was doing simultaneously was something totally outside the 
scope of his employment’ . The list of cases decided prior to the test is 75
considerable, however, from these few cases cited, it is clear that, when it comes to 
course of employment, the courts have always looked at the relationship between 
the job that the employee was hired to do and the tortious act that they have 
committed. 
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An example can be seen in Hilton v Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd . In that case a 76
workman detoured eight miles for tea immediately after lunch at a pub. The accident 
that followed led to his death. The court held that the employer could not be found 
liable as the link between the act and the job that they were employed to do was too 
vague. Similarly, in Daniels v Whetstone Entertainments  a steward in a dancehall, 77
employed to maintain order, assaulted a customer, thinking that they had had 
previous confrontation with them. Disregarding the employer’s instructions, they then 
followed them outside and attacked the customer again. The employer could only be 
found liable for the ﬁrst attack and not for the second as the employer had strictly 
prohibited the second attack. As can be seen from these cases, when the employer 
had strictly prohibited something, if the employee goes against this, the court is likely 
to hold that they were on a frolic of their own – however, express prohibitions will not 
necessarily stop vicarious liability as per the Limpus authority. This case is very 
similar to Mattis v Pollock , which is discussed in detail later. In Mattis, even though 78
the facts were similar, the court relied on an entirely new test to reach a very different 
decision.
The rule, that the employer will not be liable if the employee is on a frolic of their 
own, is not applied as strictly as may be thought. In Rose v Plenty , a milkman had 79
been told by his employer to not allow children to help him do his job and to ride in 
cart. The employee had disobeyed this order and a thirteen-year-old was injured 
while in the cart. The Court of Appeal found the employer liable here as the act did 
not go beyond the course of employment. Scarman LJ explains: 
‘The servant was, of course, employed at the time of the accident to do a 
whole number of operations. He was certainly not employed to give the boy a 
lift, and if one conﬁnes one's analysis of the facts to the incident of injury to 
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the plaintiff, then no doubt one would say that carrying the boy on the ﬂoat — 
giving him a lift — was not in the course of the servant's employment.’  80
But in Ilkiw v Samuels  Diplock LJ indicated that the proper approach to the nature 81
of the servant's employment is a broad one. He states:
‘As each of these nouns implies, the matter must be looked at broadly, not 
dissecting the servant's task into its component activities — such as driving, 
loading, sheeting and the like — by asking: what was the job on which he was 
engaged for his employer? and answering that question as a jury would.’  82
Hence, when Scarman LJ, in Rose, referred back to the statement made by Diplock 
LJ they commented:
‘Applying those words to the employment of this servant… (h)ow did he 
choose to carry out the task which I have analysed? He chose to disregard 
the prohibition and to enlist the assistance of the plaintiff. As a matter of 
common sense, that does seem to me to be a mode, albeit a prohibited mode, 
of doing the job with which he was entrusted. Why was the plaintiff being 
carried on the ﬂoat when the accident occurred? Because it was necessary to 
take him from point to point so that he could assist in delivering milk, 
collecting empties and, on occasions, obtaining payment.’83
In other words, as the milkman was doing what he was hired to do (which was to 
deliver milk) at the time of the incident, he was in the course of his employment. This 
case has also helped to set a precedent that if the employer is beneﬁtting from the 
wrongful act, as they were in this case, then this too should contribute to the 
employer’s liability – employers accept the beneﬁt, so why should they not accept 
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the burden? This principle, known as the ‘broad risk’ principle, was discussed in 
Hamlyn v Houston & Co  - in hiring the employee, the employer accepts the beneﬁt 84
and hence the risk of that contact. 
Another main deciding factor in vicarious liability cases can also be if the victims are 
particularly vulnerable (for instance young or disabled). In Commonwealth v 
Introvigne  Mason J said that ‘the immaturity and inexperience of the pupils and the 85
propensity for mischief suggests that there should be a special responsibility on the 
school authority to care for their safety’ . In this Australian case, a mischievous pupil 86
sustained severe head injuries while skylarking unsupervised and the defendants 
were found liable. This point has been raised in many cases concerning children 
being injured or abused. In Belfron Trustees Ltd v Peterson , Laddie J said ‘the 87
terms of the employment become less important than the fact of the employment and 
the relationship between the victim and the employer becomes crucial’ . This case 88
involved fraud, however, the principle is that if the employer owes the victim a duty of 
care, they cannot free themselves from that duty by delegating it to an employee. If 
the victim is especially vulnerable, it can be almost certain that the employer will owe 
that victim a duty of care from before the employee even comes into consideration. 
In New South Wales v Lepore , it was also said that ‘vicarious liability depends upon 89
the employer owing a duty to the victim, performance of which he has detected to 
entrust to an employee who then commits the wrongdoing in question’ .90
The Salmond test has been applied in many cases since its creation, such as in the 
case of Trotman v North Yorkshire County Council , in which the council was not 91
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found liable for the sexual assault of a pupil. The act could not in any way be 
deemed as authorised or even an unauthorised mode of doing an authorised act. 
This case can be contrasted here with Lister v Hesley Hall  as the decision of Lister 92
overruled the Trotman decision.
Lister concerned a boarding school in which a warden, responsible for looking after 
the boys, sexually assaulted some pupils. The defendants were held vicariously 
liable on appeal. In order to compare this case with Trotman, we must ﬁrst consider 
the statements of Lord Steyn in Lister in which he explains the reasons for the 
decision and the departure from the Salmond test. Lord Steyn begins his discussion 
by making reference to the case of Lloyd v Grace Smith & Co  in which the 93
managing clerk at a ﬁrm of solicitors convinced clients to transfer their money to him 
and then spent it for personal gain. Lord Steyn said ‘this decision was a 
breakthrough: it ﬁnally established that vicarious liability is not necessarily defeated if 
the employee acted for his own beneﬁt’ . The Lloyd case was then applied in Morris 94
v CW Martin & Sons Ltd  in which an employee stole a mink wrap instead of 95
cleaning it – the employer was held liable for the loss. In the decision, Salmon LJ 
held that ‘the defendants are liable for what amounted to negligence and conversion 
by their servant in the course of his employment’ . This case was described as ‘a 96
striking and valuable extension of the law of vicarious liability’  and it has been 97
treated as an authority on vicarious liability beyond bailment . The Privy Council 98
also expressly approved of Morris in Port Swettenham Authority v T W Wu & Co .99
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Lord Steyn then made reference to the case of Racz v Home Ofﬁce  in which it 100
was established that an employer can be held liable for intentional wrongdoing of 
their employee. Lord Steyd said:
‘It remains, however, to consider how vicarious liability for intentional 
wrongdoing ﬁts in with Salmond's formulation. The answer is that it does not 
cope ideally with such cases. It must, however, be remembered that the great 
tort writer did not attempt to enunciate precise propositions of law on vicarious 
liability. At most he propounded a broad test which deems as within the 
course of employment "a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act 
authorised by the master". And he emphasised the connection between the 
authorised acts and the "improper modes" of doing them. In reality it is simply 
a practical test serving as a dividing line between cases where it is or is not 
just to impose vicarious liability. The usefulness of the Salmond formulation is, 
however, crucially dependent on focusing on the right act of the employee’ .101
Therefore, the Salmond test, although useful in many cases, cannot be used as a 
general rule for imposing liability as in many situations its use will lead to an unjust 
decision. This point was then explored in Rose v Plenty , where Lord Steyn made 102
reference to in Lister – this point has already been discussed. Having discussed 
Rose, Lord Steyn moved on to conclude that the test to be applied is that of ‘close 
connection’:
‘It is not necessary to ask the simplistic question whether in the cases under 
consideration the acts of sexual abuse were modes of doing authorised acts. 
It becomes possible to consider the question of vicarious liability on the basis 
that the employer undertook to care for the boys through the services of the 
warden and that there is a very close connection between the torts of the 
warden and his employment. After all, they were committed in the time and on 
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the premises of the employers while the warden was also busy caring for the 
children’ .103
This, therefore, explains how the Lords came to hold the school vicariously liable and 
created the ‘close connection’ test. Lord Steyn continued by discussing the 
application of the correct test by stating that its creation was greatly inﬂuenced by the 
cases of Bazley v Curry  and Jacobi v Grifﬁths . He opines ‘wherever such 104 105
problems are considered in the future in the common law world these judgments will 
be the starting point. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to express views on the 
full range of policy considerations examined in those decisions’ . In relating the 106
case of Lister to the new test, for Lord Steyn ‘the question is whether the warden’s 
torts were so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to 
hold the employers vicariously liable’  – hence, the ‘close connection’ test. It has 107
been argued that ‘the facts in Lister shouted vicarious liability so loudly the outcome 
was obvious the moment the Lords freed themselves from the wooden reading of the 
Salmond test.’108
Giliker stressed that the judges in Lister created the new test due to ‘a sense of 
injustice at the inability of the victims of abuse to access compensation when 
mistreated by a carer employed to safeguard their interests.’  This statement may 109
make it appear that the Lister principle would only be effective in abuse cases, 
however, its application appears to stretch to all areas of vicarious liability law . 110
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McIvor states that this gives litigants the impression that vicarious liability is now 
more likely to succeed than not . 111
At this point, a comparison between Lister and Trotman may be made as the facts 
are very similar. Trotman was a mentally disabled pupil who was sexually assaulted 
on a school trip to Spain. The reason why the council could not be found vicariously 
liable was, following the Salmond test, the act was not an unauthorised manner of 
doing an authorised act. However, both employees in the cases had ample 
opportunity to get close to the children and be alone with them, hence being able to 
commit the acts of sexual assault. It has already been commented that had the 
judges in Lister applied Salmond, the employer would not have been found liable, 
however, they were following the ‘close connection’ test. The decision of Trotman 
was overruled because if the ‘close connection’ test, seen by the courts as a fairer 
test, had been created before Trotman, the employer would have been found liable, 
hence making the original decision unjust. 
The judgment of Lord Hobhouse in Lister is also one worthy of discussion. He 
explained the Salmond test further, speciﬁcally stating that the second element could 
not in any way be applied to child abuse cases as ‘abusing children cannot properly 
be described as a mode of caring for children’ . He goes on to state ‘whether or not 112
some act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment depends upon an 
identiﬁcation of what duty the servant was employed by his employer to perform’  – 113
this point was taken from the case of Kirby v National Coal Board . Here Lord 114
Hobhouse was explaining the importance of ﬁnding a link between the job and the 
act – the job cannot merely give the employee the opportunity to commit the act if we 
are applying the Salmond test.
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He moves on to state that the correct approach in cases such as that of Lister is to 
ask: 
‘what was the duty of the servant towards the plaintiff which was broken by 
the servant and what was the contractual duty of the servant towards his 
employer. The second limb of the classic Salmond test is a convenient rule of 
thumb which provides the answer in very many cases but does not represent 
the fundamental criterion which is the comparison of the duties respectively 
owed by the servant to the plaintiff and to his employer. Similarly, I do not 
believe that it is appropriate to follow the lead given by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Bazley v Curry 174 DLR (4th) 45.’115
Therefore, in some cases, the Salmond test may still be relevant. However, in most 
cases, especially those concerning child abuse, the new ‘close connection’ test will 
provide a more just outcome. Lord Hobhouse concludes by saying that ‘legal rules 
have to have a greater degree of clarity and deﬁnition than is provided by simply 
explaining the reasons for the existence of the rule and the social need for it’ . This 116
is achieved by explaining how the rule has developed over time and through case 
law precedent. Most rules in the English common law are created through many 
years of consistent case law decision-making which tends to suggest a predictable 
outcome. For example, if one rule leads to unjust decisions then the new rule will be 
created in order to avoid this injustice, such as the movement from the (singular) 
‘control test’ to the more encompassing series of questions included in the ‘Ready 
Mixed Concrete’ test.
When noting the crucial principles that arise from the decision of Lister, it can be 
noted that Lord Hobhouse said that it was still necessary to discover and deﬁne what 
the employee is employed to do. This statement was made even though Lord Millet 
said that ‘what is crucial is that attention should be directed to the closeness of the 
connection between the employee’s duties and his wrongdoing and not to verbal 
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formulae’ . This would include what he actually does, what he can do contractually 117
and the effect of any prohibitions. The Salmond test should still be used, following 
Lister, to distinguish between what the employee does and what he is authorised to 
do, however, it is no longer necessary to connect the act with the duty using the 
Salmond formulation.
When coming to a judgment, the Lords in Lister inadvertently applied the test for 
vicarious liability created in the Canadian Supreme Court case of Bazley. This case 
concerned a non-proﬁt organisation which operated residential care centres for 
children. Curry was an employee of the organisation and, over the course of sixteen 
years was found to have sexually assaulted children on around 20 different 
occasions, two of which involved the claimant. The court was troubled with two 
questions: can an employer be held liable for sexual assaults on persons within their 
care? Furthermore, if so, should a non-proﬁt organisation be exempt?
In its judgment, the court considered that vicarious liability is predominantly used to 
‘sue into deeper pockets’, hence raising the question of whether it is ethical to allow 
for vicarious liability to be imposed on non-proﬁt organisations. McLachlin J adapted 
Fleming’s policy rationale for imposing vicarious liability  to conclude that: it would 118
provide a just and practical remedy, as well as deterring future harm. The court 
considered the Salmond formulation but expressed great frustration with it – Curry’s 
actions could be viewed as both totally independent and an unauthorised mode of 
doing an authorised act – Salmond does not provide for differentiating between the 
two. The Court came to the decision that they should consider:
1) policy reasons that will determine whether vicarious liability should, or should 
not, apply; and 
2) whether the wrongful act is sufﬁciently related to the employment to justify 
imposing vicarious liability. 
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They also went on to say that vicarious liability will generally be appropriate when 
there is a signiﬁcant connection between the creation or enhancement of the risk and 
the act. It is noticeable here that this test is highly similar to the Lister ‘close 
connection’ test. However, whilst Bazley can only be of persuasive authority, Lister 
has the power to bind. 
This is an appropriate juncture at which to discuss the ﬁrst element the court felt it 
should consider (policy reasons). Finch J.A. ‘took the view that outcomes in this area 
of the law rest more on policy considerations than on adherent legal principle, and 
advocated a case-by-case, policy-orientated approach.’  It was also found that:119
‘Increasingly, courts confronted by issues of vicarious liability where no clear 
precedent exists are turning to policy for guidance, examining the purposes 
that vicarious liability serves and asking whether imposition of liability in the 
new case before them would serve those purposes.’120
But what are the policy considerations that could lead to vicarious liability being 
voided? Tutin states that ‘It would be contrary to public policy if businesses were held 
liable for the actions of others in areas in which it has no knowledge or competence 
[in the skills of independent contractors] and therefore were unable to control the 
risk.’  121
When considering public policy, a few cases are worth consideration – the ﬁrst being 
Lane v Shire Rooﬁng . Here Lane was hired by the defendant company as a 122
building worker and was paid on a day-by-day basis, which was unusual. Lane was 
injured and it was held he was an independent contractor. Lord Henry said: 
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‘When it came to the question of safety at work, there was a real public 
interest in recognising the employer/employee relationship when it existed, 
because of the responsibilities that that the common law and statutes such as 
the  Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 placed on the 
employer.’123
This case will also have importance in the later discussion of the Mohamud  case, 124
with reference to health and safety. Another case which is important to the public 
policy discussion is O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte Plc  in which waiters were hired for 125
dinner functions at a hotel – the employer was under no obligation to offer work and 
they were under no obligation to accept the work. The waiters organised a trade 
union and were subsequently dismissed and argued unfair dismissal – the employer 
counter-claimed that they were not covered under the legislation as it only covered 
employees. It was held that they were not technically employees as the contact 
lacked ‘mutuality’ – even though the trade union discrimination legislation protected 
them, they did not have the access to the court to make the rights effective. 
‘Mutuality of obligation’ was thought at that time to mean an ongoing obligation to 
offer and accept work, however, this decision has been consistently doubted . It 126
has since been reversed by the Trade Union and Labour Regulations (Consolidation) 
Act 1992, s. 146 and the reasoning has been superseded by Autoclenz Ltd v 
Bencher , in which it was said that “mutual” obligation is merely consideration for 127
remuneration. 
The ﬁnal case to be considered here is Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner  in 128
which two female employees started working from home after falling pregnant. They 
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sewed together trouser ﬂaps, using the claimant’s sewing machines, and were paid 
depending on how many products they produced. They were under no obligation to 
accept the work. There was a dispute between the employer the women about 
holiday pay which led to an unfair dismissal claim. But were they employees? The 
Industrial Tribunal held them to be employees and the court concurred. The 
employer appealed. The Court of Appeal held that whether a contract was for 
services was a matter of fact, not law. In the Court’s view, there was an ‘umbrella’ 
contract, under which there was an implied obligation for the provision and 
acceptance of work. In order for a contract of employment to exist, ‘There must, in 
my judgement, be an irreducible minimum of obligation on each side’ . In essence, 129
where there is ‘mutuality of obligation’ between casual or temporary workers and 
their employer it is a contract of employment. 
Another public policy aspect that the Court may consider is if the employer is a non-
proﬁt organisation, working for the beneﬁt of others. When the ﬁnal decision was 
made by the Court in Bazley, it was decided that if Curry was left alone with the 
children for long periods of time and was expected to do things such as bathe them, 
there was a sufﬁciently close connection between the risk created by the work and 
the act. Essentially, the Foundation had signiﬁcantly increased the risk of harm by 
creating such a situation and should therefore be vicariously liable. Some may argue 
that the employer should have put a preventative measure in place here. However, 
as Lord McLachlin puts it:
‘A wrong that is only coincidentally linked to the activity of the employer and 
duties of the employee cannot justify the imposition of vicarious liability on the 
employer… Because the wrong is essentially independent of the employment 
situation, there is little the employer could have done to prevent it…  I 
conclude that a meaningful articulation of when vicarious liability should follow 
in new situations ought to be animated by the twin policy goals of fair 
compensation and deterrence that underlie the doctrine, rather than by 
artiﬁcial or semantic distinctions.’130
 As per Stephenson LJ, at page 621129
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In appealing this decision, the Foundation argued three reasons why non-proﬁt 
organisations should be exempt from vicarious liability:
1) it is unfair to ﬁx liability without fault on non-proﬁt organisations who perform 
much needed services to the community as a whole;
2) non-proﬁt organisations often work with volunteers and hence are less able to 
supervise them than an employer supervising a paid employee; and
3) a successful claim for vicarious liability will leave many non-proﬁt 
organisations out of business and hence unable to do their vital work for the 
community.
McLachlin J dismissed these arguments as ‘crass and unsubstantial utilitarianism’. 
He pointed out:
‘If, in the ﬁnal analysis, the choice is between which of two faultless parties 
should bear the loss — the party that created the risk that materialized in the 
wrongdoing or the victim of the wrongdoing — I do not hesitate in my answer. 
Neither alternative is attractive. But given that a choice must be made, it is 
fairer to place the loss on the party that introduced the risk and had the better 
opportunity to control it’ .131
A key case which followed the decision in Lister is Maga v The Trustees of the 
Birmingham Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church . Here, a priest sexually 132
abused a non-Catholic boy and the church accepted that he was an employee. The 
priest in this case gave the boy odd jobs to do, however, this did not amount to his 
priestly duties . The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that, as the priest 133
specialised in youth work and was employed to spread his faith to both believers and 
non-believers, there was some connection between the act and his duties. The 
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defendants in Maga tried to argue that the claimant’s case was weaker than that of 
the claimant’s in Lister and hence the ‘close connection’ test could not lead to 
vicarious liability. Here this argument was rejected. 
The ‘close connection’ test requires there to be the presence of opportunity. In Maga 
the court made reference to the case of Jacobi  in which the director of a children’s 134
club sexually assaulted two children. In this case, no liability was found as the 
opportunity the director had to isolate the children was very slight and hence the 
connection could not be made. The judges held:
‘Both the case law and the broader policy considerations clearly suggested 
that the imposition of no-fault liability in the present case would overshoot the 
existing judicial consensus about appropriate limits of an employer's no-fault 
liability. The case law revealed the historical reluctance of judges to ﬁx 
employers with no-fault liability on the basis merely of job-created opportunity 
to commit a tort as in the present case, without job-created power, even 
where accompanied by privileged access to the victim, although vicarious 
liability had been imposed in cases where the strong connection was 
enhanced by a combination of job-created power and job-created intimacy, 
the hallmarks of a parenting relationship.’135
However, in Maga there was a much greater opportunity for the priest to isolate the 
child – they were not always meeting in group situations like those presented by the 
children’s club. Lord Neuberger said that the priest’s role allowed him to ‘draw the 
claimant further into his sexually abusive orbit by ostensibly respectable means 
connected with his employment as a priest at the church’ . Particular attention was 136
also drawn to the fact that the priest was never off duty. Lords Longmore and Smith 
also emphasised that liability does not simply stem from evangelical duties of the 
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church but might be imposed on those that encourage priests to develop intimate 
relationships with young people.
When discussing the struggle the judges had in Maga with applying the ‘close 
connection’ test, Giliker states that ‘One obvious difﬁculty derives from the failure of 
the House of Lords in Lister to provide a single version of its close connection 
test’ . In her article, Giliker explains that Lords Steyn and Hobhouse provide one 137
version of the test, whereas Lords Millet and Clyde provide another – accompanied 
by the material risk of harm element added by Mclachlin J in Bazley, one can 
understand where the courts have trouble. Here we could, again, ask should there 
be a prescribed method? This point shall be discussed in more detail later.
In Maga, all 3 versions or extensions of the test were applied with all of the judges 
reaching the same decision. It cannot be said which version is correct as even the 
Lords in Lister could not agree – it seems to be for reasons of luck rather than design 
that they all came to the same conclusion here. The lower courts have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the test when it comes to applying it. It seems that they should 
focus on the nature of the duties of the employee, rather than the facts of each 
individual case according to Giliker. If here we make reference to Dyer v Munday , 138
where the manager of a furniture dealership assaulted a customer’s landlord, it can 
be said that ‘Vicarious liability thus arises where the employee harms the very thing 
he was employed to protect’ . Giliker goes on to say that ‘Maga, therefore, 139
indicates that Lister has far from resolved the question of the scope of employment 
and that courts will continue to struggle to apply the overlapping Steyn/Hobhouse/
McLachlin tests in borderline cases’ . The ‘close connection’ test has been a topic 140
of great debate for many academics. However, given the word count available, only 
a small number shall be referred to.
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Yap, when referring to the ‘close connection’ test, states that ‘this touchstone test 
simply begs the question of how close must the nature of employment and the 
tortious act be before liability can be found’ . Further, ‘The close connection test in 141
itself merely provides the court with a formula to conﬁrm its results, not reach one’ . 142
In Lister, the test worked because, as Lord Steyn said, the connection was 
sufﬁciently close because the warden was entrusted with the care of children and the 
abuse took place while he was performing his duties. Lord Clyde agreed with this 
and emphasised that the warden was given a general authority to supervise and run 
the house in which the children were staying. Lord Hobhouse added to this by stating 
that liability arises from the employer’s voluntary assumption of a relationship with 
the victim and their decision to entrust those duties on the employee. Finally, Lord 
Millet pointed out that there is an inherent risk in boarding schools of sexual assaults 
being performed by those in a position of authority.
Yap states that the previous tests used in establishing vicarious liability are useless 
when the employee has engaged in ‘wilful and deliberate misconduct’ . This brings 143
our attention to Warren v Henlys  in which a garage attendant physically assaulted 144
a customer who drove off without paying – the garage could not be found liable for 
their employee as the act was one of personal revenge. If the Salmond test was to 
be used here, it could be found that this act was a wrongful mode of performing an 
authorised act – part of the attendant’s job was to ensure that customers paid. 
However, this would lead to the garage being liable which could be an unjust 
outcome. This led Yap to suggest that ‘The Salmond formula was perhaps doomed 
to fail from the start’ . Hence, in Lister, the Lords decided that the courts should 145
focus on the relative closeness between the tort and the nature of the employment. 
Lord Clyde pointed out that sufﬁcient connection would arise where the ‘employer 
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has been entrusted with the safekeeping or the care of some thing or some person 
and he delegates that duty to an employee’ . 146
Giliker is critical of the above statement and states that ‘references to duties 
“entrusted” or “delegated” to the employees seems more indicative of primary 
liability, rendering the term “vicarious” redundant in the circumstances’ . Here, she 147
is saying that where the employer assumes a relationship between themselves and 
the victim, one which involves responsibility, and they delegate that responsibility to 
be employee, the line between vicarious and primary liability becomes blurred. The 
principle that in vicarious liability the employer is not at fault becomes 
questionable . McIvor  also describes the Close Connection test as ‘too vague 148 149
and unpredictable to work as a judicial tool in determining whether it is appropriate to 
impose vicarious liability’ . Finally, Glofcheski suggests that the test is justiﬁed for 150
intentional torts, but questions if it should be used for negligence-based torts . This 151
theory is now discussed in greater detail, focusing speciﬁcally on the criticisms of 
Yap and relevant case law. 
2.4.1 POST-LISTER: INTENTIONAL TORTS
In the case of New South Wales v Lepore  the court was divided on whether or not 152
to follow Lister and Bazley. Gleeson CJ and Kirby J both felt that the court should 
follow the cases in making their decision. Conversely, Gummow and Hayne JJ, both 
stated that when considering intentional torts, the employer should be found liable:
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‘if the wrongful act is done in intended pursuit of the employer’s interest or in 
intended performances of the contract of employment . . . or where the 
conduct of which complaint is made was done in . . . the apparent execution 
of the authority which the employer held out the employee as having.’  153
In commenting on this opposing test, Yap stated:
‘Admittedly, this test is logically defensible and is a marked improvement over 
the Salmond formulation but its application would prevent claimants in the 
same positions as the plaintiffs in Lister and Bazley from seeking redress 
against the employer under the law of vicarious liability.’154
The courts have historically followed the decisions of cases with facts that are similar 
or the same as the one they are deciding. This principle of binding (and persuasive) 
precedent can be illustrated by two cases – the ﬁrst, Donoghue v Stevenson , is a 155
case which established the modern law of negligence in contract law and the 
neighbor rule. Subsequently, the decision of this case was applied in Grant v 
Australian Knitting Mills  due to the precedent the Donoghue principle held. 156
McLeod stated that:
‘The idea of precedent may be formulated in a relatively wide way, by simply 
saying that it is desirable that similar cases should be decided in a similar 
manner. This wide view of precedent is based partly on the proposition that 
consistency is an important element of justice; partly on the fact that the 
practice of following previous decisions results in improved efﬁciency, 
because points of law which have once been decided can simply be applied 
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subsequently, without being subject to repeated re-argument; and partly on 
judicial comity. 
‘It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts in any developed legal system 
are likely to follow precedent to a signiﬁcant extent. Certainly there is nothing 
peculiarly English about such a practice. However, the idea of precedent may 
also develop in a rather narrower sense, with the result that courts may regard 
themselves as being actually bound to follow earlier decisions. The use of 
precedent in this narrow sense is largely peculiar to English law, although it is 
also evident to some extent in the other common law jurisdictions which 
derive from English law.’157
Here, McLeod is making the point that this second test would prevent this practice 
and hence it could lead to claimants in cases similar to Lister and Bazley leaving the 
court without the outcome they were expecting. It is a truism that the law is not 
always predictable, however, there is a certain degree of expectation in the outcome 
of cases with almost identical facts. We must ask though, should one decision be 
unjust only to prove that the one it follows was correct? This is deﬁnitely one of the 
reasons why vicarious liability law is not ‘set in stone’, however, a statutory based 
system would not solve this problem either. It would seem that there can be no 
consistency in order to provide justice, but there can also be no consistency of 
justice if there is not some sort of framework in place. 
In Lepore, Gaudron J offered a third alternative; he argued that vicarious liability 
could be imposed when the employer is estopped from denying that the employee 
was acting as his servant. This would occur when the employee’s act or omission 
could not be said in any way to fail to be related to his duties as the servant. 
However, we must ask if this argument assists the problem posed? Was the judge 
simply attempting to offer an alternative when there seemed to be no correct method 
of determination?
 Ian McLeod, Legal Method (9th ed, Pelgrave Macmillan Law Masters 2013)157
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Another controversial case which followed Lister was Attorney General v Hartwell  158
in which the employer could not be found liable when a police ofﬁcer shot a man that 
was with the ofﬁcer’s girlfriend. In his judgment, Lord Nicholls stated that ‘Laurent’s 
activities had nothing whatever to do with police duties, either actually or ostensibly. 
Laurent deliberately and consciously abandoned his post and duties’ . Lord 159
Nicholls here was attempting to apply Lister, however, it has been criticized that this 
interpretation is far too close to the Salmond formulation – if this method had been 
applied in Lister, then the employer would not have been found liable.
In Bernard v AG of Jamaica , the court asked if the tort could fairly be regarded as 160
a reasonably incidental risk of the employer’s enterprise – it was held in this case 
that it could. In this case, a police ofﬁcer wrongfully shot and arrested the claimant 
because he wanted to use the pay phone when it was not his turn. We must ask 
here if this test is too ambitious – the risk must be inherent, inevitable or inextricable. 
The test also fails to explain cases when the action failed, even when there was an 
inherent risk. An example of this is the case of N v Chief Constable of Merseyside 
Police  – here, an off-duty police ofﬁcer sexually assaulted an intoxicated female. 161
The defendant was not found liable, however, there was an inherent risk of the tort 
being committed. But, would it not be unfair to impose liability? The ofﬁcer was found 
to be on a frolic of their own  - so should we apply the oldest rules (for example, 162
the ‘frolic’ rule) or the new ones because they were created with the old ones in 
mind?
In Bernard, the ofﬁcers were allowed to take their guns home with them when they 
were off duty, hence increasing the risk of injury. In Bazley, the Canadian Court 
stated that a tort would be committed in the course of employment if there was a 
‘signiﬁcant connection between the creation or enhancement of a risk and the wrong 
 [2004] 4 LRC 458158
 Hartwell, [17]159
 [2004] UKPC 47, No. 30 of 2003, [2005] IRLR 398160
 [2006] EWHC 3041 (QB)161
 N v CC Merseyside Police, [36]162
"44
that occurs therefrom, even if unrelated to the employer’s desires’ . Here, the court 163
considered ﬁve factors:
‘(a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his 
power, (b) the extent to which the wrongful act furthered the employer’s 
interest; (c) the extent to which the employment situation created conditions 
conducive to the wrongful act; (d) the extent of power conferred on the 
employee in relation to the victim; and (e) the vulnerability of the potential 
victims’ .164
The Canadian Court also said that vicarious liability would be imposed when the tort 
exposed the victim to a risk created by the nature of the employment.
When considering inherent risks, the court will also consider what the employer did 
to avoid this risk leading to a tort or crime being committed. In EB v Order of the 
Oblates of Mary Immaculate , a school was not found liable when a janitor in their 165
employment sexual assaulted a pupil. The Court enquired about the level of care 
taken to reduce such a risk - it was held that they had taken sufﬁcient steps in an 
attempt to avoid such an incident and hence could not be found liable. On this point, 
Yap comments:
‘Where the employer has failed to manage the risks inherent in his enterprise 
to an acceptable minimum level, he would be considered to have materially 
increased the risk of such harm occurring’ .166
2.4.2 POST-LISTER: NEGLIGENT TORTS
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In Lister, Lord Clyde stated that ‘cases which concern sexual harassment or sexual 
abuse should be approached in the same way as any other case where questions of 
vicarious liability arise’ . Hence, the Lister formulation can be used in cases 167
concerning negligent torts, as well as intentional ones. The Bazley formulation, 
however, was intended only for intentional torts. There are very few cases which 
have considered Lister and Bazley where a negligent tort was committed. However, 
in Hoeﬂing v Driving Force  the court applied the Bazley formulation to ﬁnd the 168
employer liable when his employee allowed a fellow employee to drive the van while 
intoxicated. 
The Lister formulation was also applied in Ming An Insurance v Ritz Carlton  when 169
the Salmond formulation led to the employer not being liable at two instances. In this 
case, a road accident occurred when the doorman of the employer’s hotel drove a 
bellboy in a limousine to collect food, this was not a practice allowed by the hotel. 
When applying the Lister formulation, the court here said that the concept of 
employment needed to be broadly deﬁned - the court must consider not only the 
employee’s duties but also any acts that may be necessary in order to fulﬁl those 
duties. The hotel needed the bellboy to go and collect the food, hence they should 
be liable when their employee’s negligent performance of the act leads to an injury. 
Yap has commented that the Judge in this case has left far too many questions 
about the application of the ‘close connection’ test in cases concerning negligent 
torts leading us to believe that this formulation would not be useful in such cases. 
Therefore, it may be suggested that in cases concerning negligence, the Salmond 
formulation, or perhaps another test yet to be created, would be much more useful in 
coming to a just decision. 
When considering the main points made from Yap’s discussion on Lister and the 
cases which followed, conclusions can be drawn that it is fair to make the employer 
vicariously liable in cases where they have beneﬁtted ﬁnancially from the tort and 
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where they have increased the risk of intentional torts being committed - this should 
encourage them to take preventative action. It can also be concluded that, for 
negligent torts, liability arises from inevitable risk and the employer may be assumed 
to have foreseen the inevitable and hence should have put preventative measures in 
place. Yap’s ﬁnal conclusion adds a very interesting insight into the above 
discussion. He states:
‘For a century, common law courts have placed their faith in the Salmond 
formulation. Lister came along and exposed this belief as misguided but it 
failed to bring us any closer to identifying when the connections between the 
employment and the servant’s tort were sufﬁcient to impose vicarious liability. 
Bazley’s risk-oriented analysis points us in the right direction but recourse to 
mere risk creation alone raises the danger of overturning decades of settled 
case-law on vicarious liability. In distinguishing between an employee’s 
commission of negligence-based torts and intentional ones and by imposing 
liability only when the employer has materially increased the risk of injury 
when the latter occurs, it is submitted that such a dichotomy preserves the 
sanctity of the settled case-law of our past whilst safeguarding the viability of 
any vicarious liability action in meeting the needs and possibilities of 
tomorrow’ .170
From this comment the application of vicarious liability is justiﬁed, especially where 
the employer has in some way beneﬁtted from the situation or omitted to remove 
obvious risks. 
Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam  followed Lister almost immediately and is one 171
that is highly noteworthy. In this case, a solicitor in the ﬁrm of Amhurst Brown Martin 
& Nicholson was alleged to have assisted in drafting fraudulent documents 
dishonesty and contributions were sought from the partners in vicarious liability. The 
main question that the court faced was not whether the solicitor was acting in the 
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course of employment as he clearly was, but whether it could be shown that the 
employer could be liable under Section 10 of the 1890 Partnership Act, so that 
contributions could be sought from Salaam under the Civil Liability (Contributions) 
Act 1978. The 1890 act states:
‘Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary 
course of the business of the ﬁrm, or with the authority of his co-partners, loss 
or injury is caused to any person not being a partner in the ﬁrm, or any penalty 
is incurred, the ﬁrm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so 
acting or omitting to act.’172
The court also had to ask if the act, as an equitable wrong, rather than a common 
law tort, could be included in the meaning of s.10 and hence lead to vicarious 
liability. 
At the Court of Appeal, it was held there was no vicarious liability as the doctrine only 
extends to common law torts and not equitable wrongs (Turner J). However, in the 
House of Lords, it was held that the 1890 Act is not restricted to tortious acts 
(Nicholls LJ). It was also added that the employee’s actions were in the ordinary 
course of business (Lister). Millett LJ commented that the claim could be based on 
dishonesty for liability in assisting breach of trust and at the same time could ‘be 
based simply on the receipt, treating it as a restitutionary claim independent of any 
wrongdoing’ . Millett also gave a pertinent quote to sum up vicarious liability:173
‘Vicarious liability is a loss distribution device based on grounds of social and 
economic policy. Its rationale limits the employer’s liability to conduct 
occurring in the course of the employee’s employment. ‘The master ought to 
be liable for all those torts which can fairly be regarded as reasonably 
incidental risks to the type of business he carries on… the ultimate question is 
whether or not it is just that the loss resulting from the servant’s acts should 
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be considered as one of the normal risks to be borne by the business in which 
the servant is employed.’174
There was some debate as to whether or not explicit authorisation by the partners 
was required for vicarious liability, however, it was held that it was not expected. 
Lord Nicholls commented: 
‘Perhaps the best general answer is that the wrongful conduct must be so 
closely connected with acts the partner or employee was authorised to do 
that, for the purpose of the liability of the ﬁrm or the employer to third parties, 
the wrongful conduct may fairly and properly be regarded as done by the 
partner while acting in the ordinary course of the ﬁrm's business or the 
employee's employment’ .175
One of the main reasons, however, why this case is so important in the discussion of 
the ‘close connection’ test is Lord Nicholl’s comment on it:
‘This ‘close connection’ test focuses attention in the right direction. But it 
affords no guidance on the type or degree of connection which will normally 
be regarded as sufﬁciently close to prompt the legal conclusion that the risk of 
the wrongful act occurring and any loss ﬂowing from the wrongful act, should 
fall on the ﬁrm or employer rather than the third party who was wronged. It 
provides no clear assistance on when, to use Professor Fleming’s 
phraseology, an incident is to be regarded as sufﬁciently work-related, as 
distinct from personal’… This lack of precision is inevitable, given the inﬁnite 
range of circumstances where the issue arises. The crucial feature or 
features, either producing or negating vicarious liability, vary widely from one 
case or type of case to the next. Essentially the court makes an evaluative 
judgment in each case, having regard to all the circumstances and, 
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importantly, having regard also to the assistance provided by previous court 
decisions. In this ﬁeld the latter form of assistance is particularly valuable.’176
2.4.3 VIOLENT EMPLOYEES AND HARASSMENT/ASSAULT
When considering violent employees, the court may be swayed in one direction or 
another more drastically than in cases concerning negligence or mere criminal 
action. A memorable case in English tort law is Mattis v Pollock , a case which 177
concerned a nightclub doorman stabbing a customer. One reason why this case is 
so notable is that it established that vicarious liability can be found, even when the 
act (the assault) was pre-meditated. In the case of Warren v Henlys Ltd , a case 178
previously discussed, the judges were unwilling to impose liability where assault was 
motivated by revenge or vengeance, hence it is interesting that they changed their 
approach in this case. When Warren was previously mentioned in this piece, it was 
discussed that if the Salmond test had been applied then the garage could have 
been found liable. However, the test was not used and hence there was no vicarious 
liability found. Mattis will now be discussed and analysed. 
The facts of Mattis are as follows: Cranston was employed as a bouncer at the 
defendant’s night club and one night he threw one of Fitzgerald’s friends (a 
customer) across the room and was instructed to ‘impress upon Mr Fitzgerald that 
Mr Cranston was prepared to use physical force to ensure compliance with any 
instructions that he might give to Mr Fitzgerald or any of his companions’ . Six days 179
later, Mattis attended the club with a friend (Mr Cook) and Cranston was instructed 
on that evening that Cook should be barred and ejected. One week later Mattis came 
to the club and Cook arrived with Fitzgerald. Cranston saw them and violently 
assaulted Cook, along with one of his friends. Mattis attempted to pull Cranston from 
Cook which caused several other customers to surround Cranston who eventually 
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ﬂed. When he returned to the club later that evening, Cranston stabbed Mattis in the 
back, leaving him paraplegic.
At ﬁrst instance, the trial judge found Pollock not liable as the ﬁnal attack was not 
part of one continuous string of events – when he ﬂed home, leaving his duties, he 
was no longer in the course of employment. The Judge found that ‘The lapse of time 
and intervening events were, in my judgement, of such a nature that it would not be 
right to treat the event culminating in the stabbing of Mr Mattis as one incident 
commencing in the club’ . The argument was also made in the Court of ﬁrst 180
instance that the doorman was employed to keep order and discipline, however, he 
was also encouraged to be aggressive and intimidating, this included manhandling 
customers. The argument was made that Cranston should never have been 
employed in the ﬁrst place, given his background, and certainly should never have 
been encouraged to be violent. Both of these arguments were rejected in the Court 
of Appeal by Judge LJ:
‘The stabbing of Mr Mattis represented the unfortunate, and virtual 
culmination of the unpleasant incident which had started within the club, and 
could not fairly and justly be treated in isolation from earlier events, or as a 
separate and distinct incident. Even allowing that Cranston's behavior 
included an important element of personal revenge, approaching the matter 
broadly, at the moment when Mr Mattis was stabbed, the responsibility of Mr 
Pollock for the actions of his aggressive doorman was not extinguished. 
Vicarious liability was therefore established. Accordingly, the appeal on this 
ground must succeed.’181
The court in Mattis took note of both Lister and Dubai Aluminium when making its 
decision, focusing mainly on the close connection between Cranston’s work and 
instructions and the act. It did not look to establish that the employee was in the 
course of employment. It was very important that Cranston was instructed by Mr 
Pollock and that he was known to be violent and intimidating. As Judge LJ put it:
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‘Mr Pollock chose to employ Cranston, knowing and approving of his 
aggressive tendencies, which he encouraged rather than curbed, and the 
assault on Mr Mattis represented the culmination of an incident which began 
in Mr Pollock's premises and involved his customers, in which his employee 
behaved in the violent and aggressive manner which Mr Pollock expected of 
him.’182
This case is one of many that illustrates one of the main reasons to encourage the 
enforcement of vicarious liability – here the employer is not only being held 
responsible for the actions of their employee, but also their own reckless standard for 
hiring staff. Had Mr Pollock been more careful in who he employed, paying close 
attention to any previous incidents that may be cause for concern, the entire incident 
may never have happened. Whether the ‘close connection’ test used in this case 
was the correct one or not becomes irrelevant here as one might say that the 
decision was correct, regardless of how it was made. This, however, is pure 
speculation and cannot be a general method in every case concerning vicarious 
liability as it could lead to the courts not following any tests and justifying their 
decisions by simply stating that the decision is the right one in their opinion. 
One case in which the Close Connection test was used, and was highly praised, was 
Brinks Global Services Inc v Igrox Inc . Brinks provided a delivery service and Igrox 183
provided fumigation services for large containments travelling abroad - Brinks hired 
Igrox’s company to fumigate containers holding 627 silver bars to be shipped to 
India. Two of Igrox’s employees carried out the fumigation procedure, regardless of 
the fact that the chemicals they used were out of stock, and re-sealed the container 
to make it look like it had been fumigated. Later one of the employees returned and 
stole 15 of the silver bars, Brinks sued Igrox for vicarious liability. 
In Court, Igrox argued that they could not be liable as fumigating the container 
merely provided the employee with the opportunity to steal. They did not take that 
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opportunity at the time and returned later. Therefore the theft was not carried out in 
the course of employment – the High Court rejected this argument and found Igrox 
liable. They appealed the decision based on the aforementioned argument but the 
Court of Appeal rejected this. Igrox was responsible for the containers during the 
fumigation process and they delegated that duty to the employees. There was a 
sufﬁciently close connection between the theft and the job that they were hired to do, 
therefore Igrox must be liable. When discussing the test used, Moor-Bick LJ stated:
‘Whatever may have been the position in the past, the decisions in Lister v 
Hesley Hall, Dubai Aluminium v Salaam and the cases which have followed 
them have established that the test involves evaluating the closeness of the 
connection between the tort and the purposes for which the tortfeasor was 
employed. While all the circumstances have to be taken into account, the 
authorities support the view that when making that evaluation it is appropriate 
to consider whether the wrongful act can fairly be regarded as a risk 
reasonably incidental to the purpose for which the tortfeasor was 
employed.’184
2.5. CONCLUSION
Vicarious liability is the doctrine where a principal, typically an employer, is held 
strictly responsible for the tort committed by another, typically an employee. This 
principle is based on the common understanding that the master is responsible for 
their servant (Dyer v Munday ). In order to hold the principal vicariously liable, the 185
claimant must prove that a tort was committed, by an employee and that this 
occurred in the course of their employment. Various tests have been created by the 
courts, in both tort and employment law, in order to establish if an individual is an 
employee, as opposed to an independent contractor. Each test has its advantages 
and disadvantages, however, that established in Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of 
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Pensions  - the individual is subject to a right of control, they provide a personal 186
service in exchange for remuneration and the provisions of the contract are 
consistent with that of a contract of service – is the standard generally applied. The 
leading test at present on employment status was established in Montgomery v 
Johnson Underwood . The individual must be subject to control by the employer 187
and share obligations between themselves and the employer. If these tests are 
satisﬁed, and only then, should the court/tribunal proceed to the ﬁnal test in Ready 
Mixed Concrete. 
The course of employment criterion has been a contentious issue for the courts over 
the past 200 years, essentially beginning with the principle that a servant on a ‘frolic 
of their own’ is not acting in the course of employment to hold the master liable for 
torts committed (Joel v Morison) . Judges have considered the contract which the 188
employee holds, the acts which they are employed to perform and the speciﬁcations 
of the tort they have committed in order to establish if the employee was acting in the 
course of employment when they committed the tort, along with if the employer is 
beneﬁtting from the tort (Rose v Plenty) . From the mid-1990’s the courts began to 189
use the Salmond formulation, however, this appeared to be a quick ﬁx when the 
answer was already relatively clear, but it did not provide help when the courts were 
genuinely stuck and wanted to make a just decision. 
More recently in the 2001 case of Lister v Hesley Hall , the judiciary created a 190
‘close connection’ test, which examined the closeness of connection between the job 
that the employee was hired to do and the tort that they committed. This test has 
proved itself to be a more just way of deciding vicarious liability cases when previous 
case law does not provide a solid answer. This test has also received its fair share of 
criticism in the cases which followed its creation. Many judges and academics have 
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advanced their own tests for establishing the course of employment, however, due to 
the English legal principle of precedent, this is the one that is still used today. An 
example of the tests being created by academics is the two-part formula created by 
Yap to replace the ‘close connection’ test:
‘(1) Where the employee has been negligent in the performance of his duties 
or where the employee has deliberately engaged in self-serving conduct (not 
amounting to a tort) and in doing so negligently causes injury to another, the 
employer would only be vicariously responsible if the injury suffered by the 
victim arises from the inherent risks of the employment. (2) Where the tort 
committed by the employee is trespassory/intentional in nature, the employer 
would only be vicariously liable if he has materially increased the likelihood of 
occurrence of an injury that arises from the inherent risks of the 
employment.’191
This point brings us to the second element in the thesis, the case of Mohamud v 
Morrison Supermarkets Plc , which could be described as the most signiﬁcant 192
landmark case on vicarious liability since Lister. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MODERN VICARIOUS LIABILITY
As we have seen, evolutionary, and indeed revolutionary changes have been made 
to the law of vicarious liability over the past 200 years. However, the changes and 
development of the law has not ceased. In this chapter we will look at cases such as 
Mohamud and Cox, in which the judges tie together the strands of law that have 
been established by judges in previous cases to create an arguably more ‘simple’ 
and just system of judgment. This chapter assesses if those two decisions, along 
with others decided recently, were correct, offering critique through academic opinion 
and various other judgments.
When discussing highly inﬂuential cases in vicarious liability, the case of Woodland v 
Swimming Teacher Association  is one to be noted. In Woodland the victim was a 193
10-year-old girl who sustained brain damage during a school swimming lesson. The 
swimming lessons were taught by independent instructors, supplied by the 
Association. The children’s school teachers brought them to the pool and the lessons 
were supervised by a lifeguard, along with the swimming instructor. Lord Sumpton, 
ﬁnding the Association liable, applied Gold v Essex County Council , Cassidy v 194
Ministry of Health  and Common Wealth v Introvigne  for issues on non-195 196
delegable duties. His Lordship found 5 factors to be of great importance in cases 
which concerned non-delegable duties: i) if the claimants were particularly 
vulnerable, ii) if the relationship between the claimant and the defendant was one of 
supervision/custody, iii) if the claimant had any control over how the defendant 
performed their obligations, iv) if the defendant had delegated an integral part of that 
duty to a third party, and v) if the third party had been negligent. 
The essential element in this decision was control over the claimant for performing a 
purpose entrusted to the defendant and delegated to the third party, not control over 
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the environment. The Association had a non-delegable duty of care which they 
entrusted to the contractors, and of whom they were in control. Therefore, they were 
held responsible. It is also important to note that the Court was concerned that as 
parents had a legal obligation to send their children to school, allowing an authority 
to escape liability would have been incorrect and wrong.
The importance of this case is that it subsequently became possible for an employer 
to be liable for, essentially, the torts of an independent contractor, and as we have 
already discussed, this was not previously something the courts would allow. As 
Tulley states:
‘This decision could be viewed as the courts going a step further than it has 
done previously, recognising a "non-delegable duty on the part of schools 
towards pupils in relation to certain activities outside their immediate control 
and away from school premises” .’197 198
It has been argued that this could open the ﬂoodgates for far more non-delegable 
duty claims, however, as Lady Hale made clear, cases will still be decided on a case-
by-case basis.
In Woodland Lord Sumpton also added:
‘the courts should be sensitive about imposing unreasonable ﬁnancial 
burdens on those providing critical public services [therefore] a non-delegable 
duty of care should be imputed... as far as it would be fair, just and 
reasonable.'  
199
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This was applied in the case of NA v Nottinghamshire County Council , in which 200
Lord Sumpton’s ﬁve criteria from Woodland were met, but the Court could not ﬁnd it 
‘just, fair and reasonable’ to impose liability. 
3.1. A M MOHAMUD V WM MORRISONS SUPERMARKETS PLC [2016] 
UKSC 11
As previously stated, one of the most prominent cases in vicarious liability law of the 
past few years is that of Mohamud . The facts of this case are as follows: Mr Khan 201
was an employee at Morrison’s and worked at the petrol kiosk. On the day in 
question Mr Mohamud entered the petrol kiosk and asked Mr Khan if he could print 
some ﬁles from a USB stick. Mr Khan, completely unprovoked, refused the request, 
using racist and violent language, and asked the claimant to leave. The claimant 
then walked to his car and was followed by Khan, who violently attacked him and 
told him never to return. The victim died shortly after the attack, unrelated to the 
event, therefore a family member claimed on his behalf – they shall still be referred 
to as ‘Mohamud’. 
Mohamud brought an action against Morrisons in vicarious liability, claiming 
damages for assault and battery. At ﬁrst instance the court held that Khan had 
assaulted Mohamud, but the claim for vicarious liability was dismissed. They found 
that Khan’s actions were ‘purely for reasons of his own and beyond the scope of his 
employment, so that there was an insufﬁciently close connection between the 
assault and the employment.’  Essentially, the court was saying that they were on a 202
‘frolic of their own’ , along with the view that Khan’s job was to do nothing more 203
than help and serve customers, therefore the connection was insufﬁcient. Mohamud 
then appealed the decision, which the Court of Appeal dismissed on the basis that 
Khan was placed in a position where violence was likely.
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When Mohamud ﬁnally appealed to the Supreme Court, he made an attempt to 
persuade the Court that the ‘close connection’ test should be broadened to consider 
if a reasonable observer would have considered the employee to be acting in the 
course of employment at the time of committing the tort. In essence, they were 
asking for the ‘close connection’ test to be viewed objectively, instead of merely in 
the view of the Court. The Lords stipulated that the ‘close connection’ test remains 
good without requiring further reﬁnement – even though it was imprecise and 
required the Court to make an evaluative judgment, with regard to all circumstances. 
The Lords applied Lister and found that the employee’s job was to attend to 
customers and that there was an unbroken sequence of events (Mattis). The 
employee’s actions were ‘a gross abuse of his position’ , but were in connection 204
with the job that the employer asked them to do – therefore, there was a sufﬁciently 
close connection and the appeal was allowed. 
Here we can bring Lane v Shire Rooﬁng  back in as in this case, even though the 205
claimant was held to not be an employee, and hence not covered under the 
employer’s insurance they still managed to walk away with damages. The claimant 
chose to use a ladder for the work, even though he was offered scaffolding. The 
Judges found that this was an obvious safety risk and hence when the employers 
allowed it, this was a breach of regulation 7 of the Construction (Working Places) 
Regulations 1966. As the claimant refused the scaffolding there was contributory 
negligence (50%) and hence he was awarded £102,500. We can apply this to 
Mohamud as even though it may have appeared that Khan made his decision totally 
independent of his job, if Morrisons foresaw the risk, it is their duty to put 
preventative measures in place. 
It is interesting to go into the argument made by the lawyers of Mohamud as they 
discuss the traditional approaches to vicarious liability cases – i.e. the Salmond 
formulation, the increase of risk by the employer and the ‘close connection’ test. The 
lawyers stated that the ‘close connection’ test ‘requires the court to make an 
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evaluative judgment in each case  which has resulted in arbitrary distinctions, 206
founding liability in one set of circumstances but not another’ . This is a point that 207
has been shown in this thesis to be made in many cases following the creation of the 
‘close connection’ test. The lawyers suggested the court extend the concept of 
corporate responsibility, furthermore they stipulated: 
‘The test should therefore be reﬁned by asking whether an authorised 
representative of the principal has committed a wrong in circumstances where 
the reasonable observer would consider the wrongdoer (leaving aside the 
heinousness of his behavior) to be acting in a representative capacity. Under 
that test, an employer would only be vicariously liable for the actions of those 
whom it allowed to act as its representatives while they were acting in that 
capacity. It would be responsible for the unlawful acts of the human 
embodiment of the corporation. A close connection will always exist between 
the employee's role as a representative of the corporation and any act 
whether lawful or not committed while he is acting in that capacity, but the 
quality of that connection to the scope of the employee's duties will often be 
less than that previously held to be the necessary foundation for liability.’208
If this test were to be incorporated, would the result be many more claimants being 
successful, would this open the ﬂoodgates? And how would this affect the 
employers? 
The lawyers for the defendant counter-claimed that there was no sufﬁciently close 
connection, however, the ‘close connection’ test was the right one to use as it has 
been approved in cases such as Dubai Aluminium v Salaam  and Majrowski v 209
Guy’s & St Thomas’ NHS Trust  - it is therefore well established and should not be 210
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expanded. They argued Bazley  – a wrong which is only coincidentally linked to the 211
duties of the employee, cannot impose vicarious liability , along with 212
Viachuviene  - opportunity will not sufﬁce. In commenting on the ‘close connection’ 213
test they said:
‘The test thus strikes a reasonable balance between the interests of claimants 
and the interests of employers. It is both clear and reasonable. By contrast, 
the claimant's proposed new test is uncertain and lacks the body of cases on 
the existing test to guide practitioners.’214
They also added that the ‘case should be categorised as an incidental or random 
attack’ . The claimant’s response to this was that the court must take a broad 215
approach to whether the act falls within the ‘ﬁeld of activities’ – Khan’s ﬁeld 
embraced customer interaction and therefore forged the necessary link between the 
ﬁeld of activities and the tort.
When issuing the judgment, Lord Toulson gave the most explanatory ratio decidendi. 
He began by reciting the detailed history of vicarious liability from the late 1600s to 
Lister, about which he said:
‘Contrary to the primary submission advanced on the claimant's behalf, I am 
not persuaded that there is anything wrong with the Lister approach as such. 
It has been afﬁrmed many times and I do not see that the law would now be 
improved by a change of vocabulary. Indeed, the more the argument 
developed, the less clear it became whether the claimant was advocating a 
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different approach as a matter of substance and, if so, what the difference of 
substance was.’216
Toulson then went on to say that Khan’s response was unreasonable but still in the 
‘ﬁeld of activities’, as well as in an unbroken sequence of events. The point was 
made during the arguments that Khan metaphorically removed his uniform when he 
stepped from the counter, however, Toulson did not agree with this. The fact that 
Khan used the phrase ‘keep away from here’ refers to the employer’s business, 
therefore it is not a personal remark. The court took the view that Khan’s motive was 
irrelevant and held Khan to be acting in the course of his employment.  
Lord Dyson also gave his opinion on the case and stated that the ‘close connection’ 
test ‘should only be abrogated or reﬁned if a demonstrably better test can be 
devised’ . He said that the new test proposed by Mohamud’s lawyers is ‘hopelessly 217
vague’ – he added: 
‘It is true that this test [the close connection test] is imprecise. But this is an 
area of the law in which, as Lord Nichols said, imprecision is inevitable. To 
search for certainty and precision in vicarious liability is to undertake a quest 
for a chimaera.’218
Here we can look back to when Lord Oliver said ‘to search for any single formula 
which will serve as a general test of liability is to pursue a will-o’-the-wisp’ . This is 219
an interesting contrast as the two statements were made 26 years apart and yet 
reﬂect the same view.  Lord Dyson goes on to say:
‘Many aspects of the law of torts are inherently imprecise. For example, the 
imprecise concepts of fairness, justice and reasonableness are central to the 
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law of negligence. The test for the existence of a duty of care is whether it is 
fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty. The test for remoteness of 
loss is one of reasonable foreseeability. Questions such as whether to impose 
a duty of care and whether loss is recoverable are not always easy to answer 
because they are imprecise. But these tests are now well established in our 
law. To adopt the words of Lord Nicholls, the court has to make an evaluative 
judgment in each case having regard to all the circumstances and having 
regard to the assistance provided by previous decisions on the facts of other 
cases.’220
As was said in Woodland, along with several other cases. He goes on to say:
‘there is no need for the law governing the circumstances in which an 
employer should be held vicariously liable for a tort committed by his 
employee to be on the move. There have been no changes in societal 
conditions which require such a development. The changes in the case law 
relating to the deﬁnition of the circumstances in which an employer is 
vicariously liable for the tort of his employee have not been made in response 
to changing social conditions. Rather they have been prompted by the aim of 
producing a fairer and more workable test. Unsurprisingly, this basic aim has 
remained constant.’221
And adds ﬁnally:
‘It is difﬁcult to see how the close connection test might be further reﬁned. It is 
sufﬁcient to say that no satisfactory reﬁnement of the test has been suggested 
in the present case.’222
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Young states that the scope of close connection has been widened by the decision 
of Mohamud:
‘This decision clearly affords claimants a greater chance of recourse against 
an employer following a wrongful act of an employee as the Lord Justices 
have widened the scope of the ‘close connection’ test by deciding the 
case  based on whether the action was ‘within the ﬁeld of the employee’s 
activity’ rather than having been ‘closely connected to it’. It is therefore the 
case that the usual defence put forward by employers in these types of cases 
will no longer hold as much weight if it can be shown that the wrongful act was 
committed during working hours whilst the employee was acting as a 
representative of the employer.’223
The case has widened the scope by placing heavier weighting on the ‘ﬁeld of activity’ 
and less on whether the act was a personal one. But, is it the right decision? The 
decision has given future claimants a helping hand in ensuring they are more likely 
to get the result they wanted. However, what does this mean for future cases of 
attacks made by employees? It is hard to say how this attack could have been 
prevented any further by the employer and so this decision could lead to us seeing a 
lot of similar claims where the employer has done all they can to prevent such an 
attack and is still having to pay for it. Here we may look back to the case of Lane v 
Shire Rooﬁng  in which the individual was not an employee, however, the employer 224
knew of the obvious safety risk and was hence found to be 50% liable for their 
injuries. 
When Plunkett  discusses the case, he points out how the court emphasised the 225
importance of ‘enterprise liability’ and laid to rest the old fashioned ideas of deep 
pockets and control. ‘Enterprise liability’ is:
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‘the idea that where a body uses another person to advance their interests, 
and thereby introduces an inherent risk of injury to others, if the body is to 
reap the rewards of doing so, it is only fair that they also accept the 
consequences when those risks materialise—they must take the bad with the 
good.’226
It is essentially very similar to the beneﬁt and burden principle, where by it is only fair 
that should the employer reap the beneﬁts the employee brings they should also 
reap the burdens. However, ‘enterprise liability’ also delves into how the employee 
represents the employer and is a part of that enterprise as a whole. Plunkett 
criticises ‘enterprise liability’ from several different angles – primarily the principle 
does not explain why a wrongdoing is required, to this Plunkett says:
‘Though not addressed by the court, one response to this argument might be 
that, on a corrective justice based-view of the law, absent a wrong, there is no 
need for a remedy. But such a response overlooks the fact that vicarious 
liability is strict, and not a response to a wrong of the defendant; it therefore 
fails to provide a convincing answer.’227
Plunkett also argues that when introducing ‘enterprise liability’, the need to exclude 
independent contractors is removed – hence making tests, such as the one from 
Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions  redundant. Finally, he argues that it 228
has become unclear where charities and non-proﬁt organisations ﬁt in. They say:
‘… it is, after all, one thing to say that a body which engages another to 
advance their economic interests should be liable for the losses that they 
incur in the course of doing so, but another thing altogether to say that one 
which engages another to advance any interest, even those that they are 
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under a statutory duty to pursue or are purely benevolent, should be liable for 
the losses incurred in the course of doing so, as only the former receives a 
form of gain from which they can be fairly said to be able to offset their 
losses.’229
Although it appears that Plunkett has plenty to criticise in the case’s decision, he also 
stipulates that the decision provides clarity on how the ‘close connection’ test should 
be applied in future cases:
‘Despite the difﬁculties with the reasoning in Mohamud, it could nevertheless 
be said that the result provides considerable clarity in relation to how the close 
connection test is likely to be applied in future cases. In particular, in light of 
what is an extremely liberal understanding of the "close connection" test, it is 
now difﬁcult to conceive of many circumstances that will fall outside it. Indeed, 
ﬁndings that an employee was on a "frolic of their own" are now bound to be 
few and far between.’230
One case similar to Mohamud is Vaickuviene v J Sainsbury Plc  - in this case an 231
employee of Sainsbury’s was stabbed by a fellow employee. The victim was subject 
to several racist remarks from the fellow employee (he was an immigrant) and ﬁnally 
this employee stabbed him in an aisle of the supermarket with a kitchen knife on sale 
in the store. Initially Lady Clark found that the chain could be found vicariously liable, 
however, this decision was overturned by Lord Carloway, who referred back to the 
judgment he made in Wilson v Exel UK Ltd . In Wilson an employee pulled 232
another’s head back by the hair in a prank and Lord Carloway held that: 
‘A broad approach should be adopted. Time and place were always relevant, 
but may not be conclusive and the fact that the employment provides the 
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opportunity for the act to occur at a particular time and place is not necessarily 
enough.’233
When applying this judgment in Viackuviene he stated:
‘the decision in Wilson (supra) is not to be interpreted so narrowly as to be 
applicable only to conduct in the nature of “pranks.” The use of the expression 
“frolic” in that case… is, as already noted, not indicative of triviality with 
respect to the wrongful acts in question. The principles set out in that case 
may be taken to be of general application in cases of intentional wrongdoing. 
Whilst the pursuers have sought to distance themselves from the “random 
attack” by characterising the deceased’s murder as part of a course of 
conduct amounting to harassment, there is no basis for departing from the 
court’s analysis of the law in Wilson (supra). Referring as a whole to Mr 
McCulloch’s conduct from 13 to 15 April, being the period over which the 
harassment is alleged to have occurred, does not remedy the fact that there is 
no connection between the harassment and what McCulloch was employed to 
do. Rather, McCulloch’s employment simply provided him with the opportunity 
to carry out his own personal campaign of harassment with tragic 
consequences.’234
When giving comment on the case of Mohamud, Fulbrook says ‘In this “forensic 
lottery” of appeals on racist attacks in supermarkets it would certainly seem there 
has been vindication of Lady Clark’s perspective in Vaickuviene.’  It would 235
deﬁnitely seem to be a difﬁcult decision for the courts to make when racism is 
involved as it cannot be assumed that any organisation, especially with the size and 
reputation of Morrisons or Sainsburys, would tolerate racism from their staff. 
However, when the employee is wearing the uniform, using the organisation’s name 
or simply on the property the line between liability and no liability needs to be clear. It 
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is interesting to notice that when an employee was killed by another employee no 
liability arose, but when a customer was attacked (without fatal consequences) 
liability was found. Perhaps as in Mohamud it was a customer that was attacked, and 
not a fellow employee, the repercussions were much more serious. 
As we have already discussed one of the main rationales for imposing vicarious 
liability is to ensure employers maintain a certain standard when hiring, training and 
supervising employees. It is very difﬁcult to establish if employers have made 
speciﬁc changes to how they do this after a lawsuit, however, it is interesting to look 
at how Morrison’s, for example, hired and trained their staff prior to the Mohamud 
incident. Looking through the Morrison’s training and development lesson resource a 
few key phrases they use stand out. First, they talk about how their ‘colleagues are 
central to customers receiving a quality customer service’ and that ‘training is the 
process that directly beneﬁts the business’. Here they are fully accepting the fact that 
an employee is responsible for whether the customer has a satisfying experience 
and this directly affects the business as a whole. Therefore, when Mr Khan, their 
employee, assaulted a customer this directly affected Morrison’s business, surely 
they should have taken more care in their training to ensure this sort of thing didn’t 
happen, especially if they truly believe the training of their staff directly affects them? 
Morrison’s received the Employer of the Year Award in 2011 (Oracle Retail Week 
Awards), which shows that they cannot be staying too far away from proper training 
requirements. Hence, does this mean that it is impossible to train your staff to the 
point where you have fully prevented legal liability in the future? If we look back to 
cases of vicarious liability for harassment we can see that acts such as the Race 
Relations Act 1976, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 ensure that employers have training in place to guarantee 
that employees compose themselves in a proper manner. For example, in Curry v 
NSK Steering Systems Europe Ltd , the employer put preventative measures in 236
after the incident and therefore it was insufﬁcient to avoid liability. 
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Therefore, should we ask if we need to put statutory measures in place to ensure 
employers are doing all that they can to prevent a claim? Or, should they already 
know what they have to do and if a claim ensues it’s their own doing? It is hard to 
say which of these two options is the correct one, however, we can predict with 
almost certainty that a successful claim by a victim should be enough to encourage 
the employer to make sure that it does not happen again and it can be expected that 
Morrison’s have since done this. It could be argued that it would be impossible to 
entirely prevent another racial attack such as this one again as employers cannot 
choose to not employ someone simply because they are of a different race and 
hence may cause or be a victim to discrimination .237
Fulbrook discusses Majrowski v Guy’s & St Thomas’ NHS Trust  in the case 238
comment of Mohamud. The claimant in Majrowski was gay and worked for the 
defendant. Majrowski claimed to be a victim of bullying and harassment from a co-
worker and argued the employer was vicariously liable as the bullying was a breach 
of s.1 of the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act. At trial it was held that the 
employer could not be liable as s.3 of the Act created no statutory test for which the 
employer could be liable. However, the House of Lords held that the employer was 
vicariously liable when a new statutory test, under s.10, was created. In their 
judgment, Lord Nicholls said ‘importantly, imposing strict liability on employers 
encourages them to maintain standards of ‘good practice’ by their employees.’  239
This point has already been raised and it is a very important one in the discussion of 
the Mohamud case as Morrisons is a multi-national company and their practices, it 
would be thought, should be held in the highest regard. If it were to be thought that 
their practices were not ‘up to scratch’ then it would have a much larger impact than 
a smaller, independent company. 
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Fulbrook also analyses the case of Cercato-Gouveia v Kyprianou  in which the 240
claimant was a waiter employed by the defendant. The waiter claimed to have been 
abused by the manager before being dismissed and then assaulted, causing injury. 
They claimed vicarious liability and the defendant counter-claimed that there was no 
real prospect of showing that the manager had acted in the course of employment. 
After two appeals the defendant was found vicariously liable – the court said that the 
defendant owed the claimant a duty of care that they had entrusted to the manager. 
The abuse took place in the workplace during working hours and was therefore in 
the course of employment. They also said that ‘a broad approach has to be adopted 
in considering the scope of the employment.’  It could be said that prior to the 241
Lords’ ﬁnal decision, the test for course of employment had been interpreted rather 
narrowly, however, a much broader approach was taken by the Lords. This view 
notwithstanding, future cases should interpret these two cases, and those similar to 
them, to be decided correctly and hence should be followed. 
In summary it is clear that the courts are still in favor of the ‘close connection’ test, 
even if it does have its faults. The new test proposed by Mohamud’s lawyers has the 
same aim as the ‘close connection’ test did when ﬁrst introduced – to ensure a fairer 
and more just way of determining the liability of employers. However, it can be 
argued that the proposition is far too vague. What do we mean when we say 
reasonable person/observer, for example? 
To answer this question we can look back to the case of Regina v Smith , in which 242
it was stated (sub-citing Lord Diplock in Camplin ), that:243
‘the concept of the "reasonable man" has never been more than a way of 
explaining the law to a jury; an anthropomorphic image to convey to them, 
with a suitable degree of vividness, the legal principle that even under 
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provocation, people must conform to an objective standard of behavior which 
society is entitled to expect...’ .244
The ‘reasonable man’ is not, and cannot be, a real person because that defeats the 
point of their whole creation – it is not about how a person acts but how they should 
act . It can also be very difﬁcult to establish what the reasonable man would or 245
would not do if they were in the same position as the party in question, for example, 
in the American case of Liebeck v McDonald’s Restaurants  the jury’s verdict had 246
to be overruled as it was outside the reasonable person’s view (the facts of this case 
were highly obscure and so most, if not all, of the jury would be unlikely to ever 
experience such events). As stated the ‘reasonable man’ is not the average/typical 
person and the standard they are held to does not stand independent of the 
circumstances which might affect one’s judgement. You could say it is not the 
‘reasonable man’s’ judgement that changes, it is our interpretation of what their 
judgement might be that changes. 
Nourse  states that ‘the reasonable man is an institutional heuristic, and it is a 247
heuristic whose anthropomorphic form has tended to obscure important 
questions’ . Going back to the argument made by Mohamud’s lawyers , is it best 248 249
to ask what the ‘reasonable man’ would have done in that situation, surely if they are 
not a real person we cannot ourselves be expected to conduct ourselves to that 
standard? Perhaps the correct approach is a subjective one, as opposed to an 
objective one. 
 R v Smith [2001] 1 AC 146, at 172244
 Healthcare of Home United v The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49245
 Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc.,  No. D-202 CV-93-02419, 246
1995 WL 360309 (Bernalillo County, N.M. Dist. Ct. August 18, 1994)
 Nourse, V., ‘After the reasonable man: Getting over the subjectivity/objectivity 247
question’ (2008) 11(1) N.C.L. Rev. 33
 Nourse, page 34248
 Mohamud v WM Morrison’s Supermarkets Plc [2016] UKSC 11249
"71
3.2. COX V MINISTRY OF JUSTICE [2016] UKSC 10
Another Supreme Court case which was heard at the same time as Mohamud is the 
case of Cox v Ministry of Justice . In this case a kitchen manager in a prison was 250
injured when one of the prisoners working in the kitchen disobeyed an instruction by 
carrying two bags of rice instead of one, and dropped one on the claimant. The 
Lords stipulated that in the ‘close connection’ test there are two elements – the 
relationship between the claimant and the tortfeasor, and the ‘ﬁeld of activities’ which 
the tortfeasor’s job entails. Mohamud concerned the second element, as we have 
already discussed. However, in Cox the question was if there was a sufﬁciently close 
connection or relationship between the kitchen manager and the prisoner that injured 
them. 
The Lords discussed how there was no employment contract as the prisoners 
worked under compulsion, however, it was argued that the relationship was one ‘akin 
to employment’ (as per Lord Phillips in the Christian Brothers case ). The claim 251
was dismissed at ﬁrst instance with emphasis on the involuntariness of the 
arrangement. This decision was unanimously overturned in the Court of Appeal as 
the work was essential to the functioning of the prison and if it was not done by the 
prisoners then the prison would pay someone else to do it. 
The court also examined the burden and beneﬁt principle (i.e. the employer takes the 
beneﬁt so they should also take the burden) and examined the ﬁve policy reasons 
given by Lord Phillips as to why it is usually fair to impose vicarious liability. They are 
as follows: i) the employer will more likely have the means to compensate the victims 
than the employee/tortfeasor (deeper pockets) and will most likely be insured for 
such an occasion. This reason, as we have already discussed, was departed from by 
the Lord Justices in Mohamud when they emphasised the importance of ‘enterprise 
liability’. It was also said in Cox that this element was not always relevant. ii) The tort 
will have occurred as a result of an activity that the employee was performing for the 
beneﬁt of the employer. iii) The activity is likely to be part of the business activity of 
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the employer. iv) The employer will have created the risk of the tort by employing the 
employee to perform the activity. v) The employee will have been under the control 
of the employer, to some extent. Lord Reed in Cox also felt that this element was not 
as relevant any more, however, he did say that ‘the absence of even that vestigial 
degree of control would be liable to negative the imposition of vicarious liability.’252
In the Christian Brothers case there was alleged physical and sexual abuse of 
students at a residential school for boys by the brother teachers between 1958 and 
1992. Prior to the case being brought to the Supreme Court, the board of managers 
who had control over the school were found vicariously liable, but not the Institute 
which provided the teachers, including its Head. The Board were appealing this 
decision on the basis that it was not fair for the Board to be liable but not the 
Institute. It was held by the Court, applying the two-stage test suggested by Lord 
Phillips, that the relationship between the brothers and the Institute was sufﬁciently 
akin to an employer-employee relationship (stage 1). They also found that the 
abusers could carry on the Institute’s business and further its interests while 
performing the abuse (stage 2). The fact that the teachers were also strictly told not 
to touch the boys was found to be relevant because the risk was obviously already 
clear and the Institute therefore enhanced that risk. 
Here would be a good place to fully explain the two-stage test created by Lord 
Phillips in Christian Brothers – was the relationship between the individual and the 
employer ‘one that was capable of giving rise to vicarious liability’? And, were the 
acts connected to the relationship enough to give rise to vicarious liability? This test 
was conﬁrmed and approved in both Cox and Mohamud. The essential points that 
we can gather from the ﬁrst element of the test are as follows: 
‘an employer-employee relationship will generally be considered to be 
capable of giving rise to vicarious liability; a relationship akin to employment is 
also capable of giving rise to vicarious liability; and  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an independent contractor relationship will ordinarily not be capable of giving 
rise to vicarious liability.’253
We have already discussed how the courts have established if an individual is an 
employee or an independent contractor, the importance of this case lies in the fact 
that it was held that control was no longer to be treated as the ‘critical touchstone of 
employment, albeit that it remained an important consideration.’  It was also found 254
that ‘the employer can direct what the employee does, not how he does it.’  The 255
court in Cox used this to ﬁnd that just because the prison could not stop the kitchen 
worker from carrying the bags of rice incorrectly that did not stop them from being his 
employer. Furthermore, Lord Reed said that the control test would not be appropriate 
‘if one thinks for example of the degree of control which the owner of a ship could 
have exercised over the master while the ship was at sea’ .256
The case was compared by Fulbrook to NA v Nottinghamshire County Council  in 257
which the claimant had been in foster care as a child from the age of 7 to 18 and was 
suing the local authority, pursuant that they were vicariously liable for the physical 
and sexual assaults that occurred while they were in care. The two questions asked 
by the court were: i) Is the relationship between a local authority and foster parent 
such that a local authority should be vicariously liable for their wrongful acts? And, ii) 
Does a local authority owe a child in foster care a non-delegable duty?
Males J, in the Divisional Court, found that the abuses had occurred, but accepted 
evidence of the defendant’s social care expert that there was no negligence on the 
part of the social workers involved with the claimant and her family to ﬁnd that a local 
authority cannot be vicariously liable for deliberate acts of foster parents. 
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Furthermore, a child in foster care is not necessarily owed a non-delegable duty by 
the local authority. Hence, the answer to both questions was no.
The ﬁndings of Males J were upheld in the Court of Appeal, the decision of which 
was then appealed to the Supreme Court, where it was unanimously held that the 
relationship between the local authority and its foster carers was not one that was 
‘akin to employment’ (Christian Brothers case), therefore the local authority could not 
be vicariously liable for the deliberate wrongful acts of the fosterers. Lord Tomlinson 
said:
‘In order to be non-delegable a duty must relate to a function which the 
purported delegator, here the local authority, has assumed for itself a duty to 
perform. Fostering is a function which the local authority must, if it thinks it the 
appropriate choice, entrust to others. By arranging the foster placement, the 
local authority discharged rather than delegated its duty to provide 
accommodation and maintenance for the child. True it is that the local 
authority entrusted to the foster parents the day to day delivery of 
accommodation, but accommodation within a family unit was not something 
which the local authority could itself provide and this cannot properly be 
regarded as a purported delegation of duty. It was inherent in the permitted 
choice of foster care that it must be provided by third parties.’258
This was supported by Lord Burnett, who stated that:
‘if, as is uncontroversial, parents would not be saddled with a non-delegable 
duty of this sort (a duty not to assault the appellant), that conclusion provides 
strong support for the proposition that a local authority should not be either.’259
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Along with Lady Black, who had the view that ‘to impose a non-delegable duty on a 
local authority would be unreasonably burdensome, and, in fact, contrary to the 
interests of the many children for whom they have to care.’260
When Fulbrook compared NA with Cox he said that the Cox decision seems to 
undermine the NA decision – the prison does have more control over the prisoners 
than the local authority has over its foster carers as the local authority controls what 
they do but not how they do it. However, as was said in Cox  that is all that is 261
required for a relationship ‘akin to employment’. At the time Fulbrook’s article was 
published, the decision of NA was that the local authority was not liable. However, in 
October 2017 this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court.  262
The claimants appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court, following Cox, and the 
local authority were found to be vicariously liable for the foster child, however no duty 
of care was found. Of the initial two questions considered by the court, the answers 
were now ‘yes’ to the ﬁrst and still ‘no’ to the second. Lord Reed gave the lead 
judgment and explained the justiﬁcations for the implication of the vicarious liability. 
First, the local authority recruited, ﬁnanced and supervised the foster parents, 
meaning that the parents were not in a business of their own.  Secondly, by placing 263
the child with the foster parents the local authority created the risk of abuse.  Lord 264
Reed also discussed the control the local authority held over the parents,  their 265
ability to pay damages over the parents  and the fact that there was no evidence to 266
show that the imposition of this liability would lead to local authorities being 
discouraged to place children in foster care in the future.  267
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When discussing their reasons for not ﬁnding a non-delegable duty of care, Lord 
Reed stated that the imposition of a duty of care would be too broad and give a far 
too demanding responsibility.  The duty would also create a conﬂict of interests due 268
to the local authorities’ responsibilities under the 1980 Child Care Act.  The Act 269
implies that the local authority has a duty to ‘board-out’ the child and to monitor 
them. It is not responsible for the day-to-day activities of the child, the responsibility 
for the day-to-day activities is effectively discharged once the child is in the foster 
home (section 22).  270
Lord Hughes gave the dissenting judgment, his reasons were as follows: 1) the 
outcome of the case would not have been the same if the local authority had placed 
the child with their biological parents, no liability would have been found if that were 
the case, 2) the decision is only concerned with the legislation that was in force at 
the time, not the current legislation, and 3) the court does not wish to apply unduly 
harsh standards to ordinary family life, therefore the same should be said for foster 
families.  271
Lord Hughes was essentially concerned that this decision would place undue 
responsibility on local authorities and hence discourage them from making family 
and friend placements. We may consider Lord Hughes points to be valid as we 
cannot say what this decision will lead to, although it may be assumed that it may 
discourage some local authorities from placing children in foster homes and hence 
they may decide to place them in residential homes. Residential homes present a 
much larger cost to the local authority and provide a much less personal and homely 
environment than a foster home. We must, therefore, ask if this is the right decision. 
It coincides with the decision of Cox, however, if it leads to the local authorities 
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essential being scared to place a child in foster care then this may do more harm 
than good. 
As we return to the discussion of the ‘close connection’ test, in Mohamud the Court 
failed to establish how close the connection must be to satisfy the Lister formulation 
and to this Plunkett asks if the Judges are just adding more confusion to the ‘course 
of employment’ discussion and merely shifting the questions to another issue. 
As we have already discussed, in Christian Brothers it was established that a 
relationship can give rise to vicarious liability, even if there is no contract of 
employment, if there is a sufﬁciently close connection between the relationship and 
the tort. This point was then incorporated into the Cox decision, in which it was 
discussed that the prison authorities are legally required to offer work to prisoners , 272
they are, however, excluded from a minimum wage  - in fact Lord Reed held that 273
the wage an employee receives should now have no effect on the outcome of a 
vicarious liability case, as it had no effect in Christian Brothers. 
Tutin  discusses the reasoned decision of Lord Reed in Cox, with special 274
consideration of the decisions of both Christian Brothers and JGE . Lord Reed 275
used these two cases to come to the conclusion that ‘the essential idea is that the 
defendant should be liable for torts that may fairly be regarded as risks of his 
business activities, whether they are committed for the purpose of furthering those 
activities or not.’  As Tutin explains, this is ‘intended to provide a basis for 276
identifying the circumstances in which vicarious liability may be imposed outside of 
employment relationships.’277
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A few key points from Lord Reed’s decision have been highlighted by Tutin, primarily:
‘courts should not be misled by technical arguments as to the nature of an 
employer's business or an individual's employment status. Semantic 
arguments about the meaning of words such as "business', "beneﬁt' and 
"enterprise' are unhelpful: the defendant need not be carrying on activities of a 
commercial nature; it need not be a business, enterprise or proﬁt-making body 
in an ordinary sense. It is sufﬁcient that there is a defendant which is carrying 
on business activities in the furtherance of its own interests. A further lesson 
to be drawn is that defendants cannot avoid vicarious liability on the basis of 
the tortfeasor's employment status or classiﬁcation for the purposes of 
taxation or national insurance.’278
This, therefore, puts to rest the non-proﬁt organisations’ argument, brought to our 
attention in Bazley v Curry . Its primary use here though was to highlight that the 279
prison service, an organisation which does not have the primary objective to make 
money, cannot slip from the grasps of vicarious liability due to its status. 
During the trial, the court also faced a question asked by the Ministry of Justice – 
that being, should it not always be necessary for it to be just, fair and reasonable to 
impose vicarious liability. Here it would be useful to discuss the case of Caparo 
Industries Plc v Dickman in which a test was created for duty of care – a duty will 
exist if: i) the harm is reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s conduct 
(Donoghue v Stevenson), ii) the parties are in a relationship of proximity, and if iii) it 
is fair, just and reasonable to impose liability.
Returning to Cox, the Ministry placed reliance on the fact that they work for the 
beneﬁt of the public, however, Lord Reed rejected this argument, he stated that the 
criteria set by Lord Phillips in Christian Brothers was put in place to ensure that 
vicarious liability was only being imposed where it was just, fair and reasonable – to 
re-assess the three principles in cases where they were satisﬁed would be 
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unnecessary. The ﬂoodgates argument made by the Ministry of Justice was also 
quickly shutdown by his lordship – he said that the council ‘like the Fat Boy in The 
Pickwick Papers... sought to make our ﬂesh creep.’280
Tutin comments that:
‘the decision [of Cox] makes clear that the key criterion is whether the 
commission of a wrongful act is a risk created by a defendant assigning 
activities to the individual, which are an integral part of the business activities 
carried out by the defendant and for its beneﬁt.’281
She also said that the ‘Supreme Court is to be commended for adopting an 
expansive approach in considering whether precarious employment relationships 
may give to vicarious liability.’  As they made it clear that employers will no longer 282
be able to avoid liability on ‘technicalities’, clearly this decision shows a real 
concentrated effort on employers. But is this a step too far? Have they widened the 
scope too much? Rinaldi  comments that the decision is at odds with cases such 283
as Viackuviene, a decision with similar facts but an entirely different decision. Rinaldi 
adds:
‘The approach taken here was to consider what was just in the circumstances, 
and the Supreme Court was at pains to point out that each court will need to 
make an evaluative judgement in each case.   Nonetheless, the danger from 
an employer’s point of view is that any link to an employee carrying out his 
“ﬁeld of activities” will be sufﬁcient to establish that the employer should be 
held liable.’
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So yes, this decision is a drastic one from an employer’s point of view – it is now 
easier to prove their liability. However, this does not necessarily make the decision 
wrong, perhaps employers should be ‘shaking in their boots’ in order for them to 
ensure they are doing everything they possibly can to avoid an incident. 
Tutin adds on the subject:
‘The decision reafﬁrms that employers may be vicariously liable for a number 
of precarious workers who operate under a contract for services, which may 
include contract workers, casual workers and individuals working under "zero 
hours' contracts. By expanding the scope of employers' liability, this could 
have the effect of incentivising employers to offer more training to and 
supervision of precarious workers to minimise the risk of wrongful acts or 
omissions in the course of a business' activities. This may provide a means of 
integration into the business of such workers, which is an important factor in 
considering the existence of a contractual relationship in the context of 
employment and equality protection.’284
The article concludes:
‘The Supreme Court's decision in Cox v Ministry of Justice is to be welcomed 
by claimants. It reﬁnes the ﬁve-step test espoused by Lord Phillips in the 
Christian Brothers case and makes clear that the doctrine of vicarious liability 
applies outside of special category cases. 
‘Combined with the Supreme Court's generous interpretation of the "close 
connection' test in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc, this decision 
has expanded the scope of employers' liability to victims. The law of tort, on 
the one hand, and contract, circumscribed by statute, on the other hand, have 
now diverged signiﬁcantly, with the former offering greater protection to 
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individuals. For the time being, however, the doctrine still excludes 
independent contractors from its boundaries.’285
But, should independent contractors still be excluded? The answer to this would be 
yes because of insurance. Vicarious liability remains a doctrine of rough justice and 
social convenience because it provides an easier avenue for the victims to recover 
damages. It should not be used as a stick to beat employers or to dictate trading/
organisational structure decisions-surely? The author continues:
‘By linking liability to the risk attached to a business' activities, the doctrine 
emphasises the importance of enterprise risk in the law of tort. This may lead 
to the erosion of the ﬁnal frontier of the doctrine: liability for independent 
contractors. Moreover, it may also lead to the development of a more 
progressive contractual framework of employment and equality protection.’ 286
3.3. CONCLUSION
This chapter began with a discussion of Woodland, a case which established the ﬁve 
requirements for imposing a non-delegable duty, requirements which included a 
vulnerable victim. This case also established that it now could be possible for 
employers to be liable for the torts committed by independent contractors, insofar as 
a non-delegable duty was found to exist. We could ask if this could lead to 
ﬂoodgates, however, as Lady Hale pointed out, cases will still be decided on the 
facts of each of those cases. It has also been clariﬁed that vicarious liability will only 
be imposed if it is ‘just, fair and reasonable’ to do so. 
The discussion then progressed to the case of Mohamud, in which the claimant’s 
lawyers attempted to change the Justices’ views on the current ‘close connection’ 
test. Lord Toulson held that there was virtually nothing wrong with the test – 
supported by Lord Dyson, who stipulated that certain areas of the law would always 
 Tutin, page 564285
 Tutin, page 564286
"82
be imprecise but cases needed to be decided individually. Young had the opinion 
that the scope of the ‘close connection’ test was widened by this case and Plunkett 
also gave opinion on the Lords’ creation of ‘enterprise liability’. This case, decided at 
the same time as Cox, created the two-stage test – (1) what was the relationship 
between the claimant and the tortfeasor? (2) what were the employee’s ﬁeld of 
activities and how closely connected were they to the tort?
Racial attacks were a central theme to this case, which is why Fulbrook felt it 
necessary to compare it to Vaickuviene – to which they commented ‘In this “forensic 
lottery” of appeals on racist attacks in supermarkets it would certainly seem there 
has been vindication of Lady Clark’s perspective in Vaickuviene.’  It really is 287
becoming clear that there is no right answer, especially with racial attacks like the 
one in Mohamud. 
Going back to Cox, Lord Phillips provided us, in his judgment, with the ﬁve policy 
reasons to impose vicarious liability, which have already been discussed. He also 
referred back to the two-stage test he created in the Christian Brothers Case – (1) is 
the relationship between the employee and the employer enough to give rise to 
vicarious liability? (2) is the act connected enough to the relationship to give rise? 
Cox has already established that control is no longer the essential element, however, 
when compared to NA v Nottinghamshire County Council, it has been commented 
that its decision undermines that of NA. Tutin has concluded that ‘The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cox v Ministry of Justice is to be welcomed by claimants’ – 
however, this is simply their opinion.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
When discussing the history of vicarious liability, it makes sense to consider 
predictions for the future. We cannot predict exactly how future cases will be 
determined, ably demonstrated in the many landmark legal decisions which have 
been made outside of anyone’s predictions. However, we can use previous decisions 
and academic opinion to attempt to predict how the law may change again in the 
future and the possible impact on employers, employees, victims, etc., still to come.
Perhaps the most recent case considered in this thesis is that of Bellman v 
Northampton Recruitment Ltd , in which the director of the defendant company 288
punched Bellman, who fell and hit his head, causing permanent brain damage. While 
considering whether the company was liable, the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
referred back to the recent leading authorities in vicarious liability law – Mohamud, 
Lister  and Dubai Aluminium, amongst others. They considered the principles set 289
down in those cases and their response is as follows:
‘(1) An employer is not liable for an assault by his employee merely because it 
occurred during working hours (see e.g.  Wilson v Exel UK Ltd 2010 SLT 
671  and  Graham v Commercial Bodyworks Ltd [2015] ICR 665)  and not 
axiomatically free from liability because it occurred outside normal working 
hours and/or the workplace (see e.g. Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica 
[2005] IRLR 398 and Mattis v Pollock [2003] ICR 1335).
(2) As set out in  Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] ICR 
485  there are two questions to be considered. (i) Looking at matters in the 
round or broadly, what were the functions or what was the ﬁeld of activities 
entrusted by the employer to the relevant employee, i.e. what was the nature 
of his job? This should not entail a dissection of the employment into its 
component activities, rather a holistic approach and answering the question 
 [2016] EWHC 3104 (QB), [2017] IRLR 124288
 Lister v Hesley Hall [2001] UKHL 22.289
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as a jury would. (ii) Was there a sufﬁcient connection between the position in 
which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the 
employer to be held liable under the principle of social justice? Again a broad 
approach should be taken and it is necessary to consider not only the purpose 
and nature of the act but also the context and circumstances in which it 
occurred.
(3) The test is inevitably imprecise given the nature of the issues. The 
authorities have not sought to give detailed guidance as to the nature of the 
connection as the assessment is peculiarly fact sensitive. So, while 
consideration of past cases shows that certain speciﬁc factors have been 
considered central, if not determinative, given particular circumstances, e.g. 
the material increase in risk in putting a teacher in close proximity with a 
vulnerable pupil, it remains very much a fact speciﬁc evaluation having regard 
to the full circumstances of the employment and the tort.
(4) While consideration of the time and place at which the relevant act 
occurred will always be relevant, it may not be conclusive. There must be 
some greater connection than the mere opportunity to commit the act 
provided by being in a certain place at a certain time.
(5) The policy underlying this form of strict liability should always be borne 
ﬁrmly and closely in mind.’290
In following these ﬁve principles laid down, the court found that the company were 
not liable for the attack. The attack occurred in a hotel after the party and even 
though the director’s job was to motivate staff, not put them down, at that time he 
was not their superior. 
These ﬁve criterion may be assumed to be the way in which the courts should 
approach a vicarious liability case in the future, with the most emphasis on the way 
in which the job should be performed and the relationship between that job and the 
 Bellman, [62]290
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tort committed (Mohamud). It is easy to see that the approach of the courts in 
vicarious liability cases has changed signiﬁcantly over the past 200 years. Originally, 
what simply had to be shown was that there was a master and a servant and that the 
servant was not merely on a ‘frolic of their own’. Now, however, the courts must 
establish primarily if the worker is an employee or independent contractor, through 
consideration of their role within the company and the speciﬁcs of their contract. We 
have already discussed the relevant tests for employment, however, Tulley points out 
that since the decision of Cox, all that now needs to be shown is that the tortfeasor’s 
job was an integral part of the organisation . This is similar to the integration/291
organisation test for employment from Cassidy v Ministry of Health .292
The court must also establish if they are in the course of their employment, through 
consideration of what their ﬁeld of activities is and how that is linked to the tort 
(Mohamud). There has also been much more emphasis placed upon the relationship 
between the employer and the victim and if the employer owes the victim any sort of 
duties which they have delegated to the employee (Woodland). 
Perhaps one of the biggest changes still to come could be an increase in the cost of 
employers’ insurance due to the increasing number of successful claims and the 
widening of the scope of vicarious liability in cases such as Woodland and 
Mohamud . Donnelly and Cousins state that ‘this ﬂexible interpretation may lead to 293
more claims which try to further extend the scope of the required connection’  – in 294
reference to the liability for a racist attack in Mohamud. They go on to say:
‘Insurers will quite rightly be concerned that the test is seemingly moving 
towards the employee’s remit of employment being read to such an extent 
that almost any action he takes during the employer’s time may satisfy the 
 Laura Tulley, ‘Reﬂections of Woodland v Essex County Council: a step too far for no-fault 291
liability?’ 2016 B.S.L. Rev. 47
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test. The court was quick to try to quash any suggestion that this would lead 
to an opening of the ﬂoodgates noting that no evidence of this was before the 
court. However, the Mohamud case does appear to bridge the gap and could 
be seen in part to dilute the requirement for any physical assault to arise out 
of the tortfeasor’s employment duties involving an obvious element of keeping 
control and order (as in the ‘nightclub bouncer’ run of cases, Mattis v Pollock 
(2003) et al). It will be interesting to see how far outside of the physical 
assault arena this extension may be allowed to stray.’295
One of the arguments we could make to ensure that ﬁndings of vicarious liability are 
justly decided is through the creation of a statute. The common law can be beneﬁcial 
as statute can be interpreted in many different ways, some quite wrongly. However, 
statute is designed to keep people safe and is created where there is a need for it. It 
also has the beneﬁt of there being a predetermined punishment/ﬁne. Judges are 
able to use both statute and precedent to make a decision, therefore, if statute were 
to be created, the court could still use the prescribed tests created in previous cases 
to make their decision. It has been commented that ‘Statutory law will only give a 
rigid, formal interpretation of the law. It does not always apply easily to all situations. 
This is why it is beneﬁcial for judges to refer to prior cases, rather than legislation’ . 296
However, as has been shown in this thesis, the court also struggles with their 
interpretation of precedent and the constant change in views can lead to a large 
amount of confusion. 
Contract law is another area in which judges use precedent to decide their cases, 
however, statutes such as the Consumer Rights Act 2015 exist to govern contracts 
and protect victims. This Act consolidates existing consumer protection law 
legislation and gives new rights and remedies. If this duel system of precedent and 
statute works in contact law, what is to say it would not work in torts law? 
Speciﬁcally, vicarious liability. 
 Donnelly, P. & Cousins, A., ‘Vicarious liability is on the move…’ (available at http://295
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4.1. CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the ﬁve principles established in Bellman to sum up the 
current legal situation in vicarious liability and we found that these should be referred 
back to in future cases. At the present time the courts must establish if an individual 
is an employee or an independent contractor, as they have in the past, if they were in 
the course of employment and the duty which the employer owes to the victim, if any, 
should be established. 
It is difﬁcult to say what the future will bring, however, one thing we can say with 
certainty is that the cost of insurance for employers will go up with the increase in 
successful cases. Will this deter employers from creating the risk of an incident? 
Only time will tell. 
It was also discussed if perhaps a statutory system would be better, ﬁnding that both 
systems have their advantages and disadvantages. However, we may consider a 
duel system to be the most attractive option. If we consider its use in contract law it 
can be very beneﬁcial to both the courts and the victims. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
The aims of this thesis were to discuss the history of English vicarious liability law, 
with special reference to case authority and academic criticism, from the mid 1800s 
to 2017. Highly inﬂuential cases including Lister and Mohamud have been analyzed 
and a discussion has been made as to how those cases have changed the common 
law and what this could mean for the future of the law. 
As has been established, in order for one to be found vicariously liable for an 
individual’s tort, the individual must be an employee and have been in the course of 
employment at the time of committing the tort or offence. Therefore, chapter 1 began 
by discussing the various tests for employment, from the ‘control’ and ‘integration’ 
tests to the test from Ready Mixed Concrete. As was shown, the favoured test is the 
last, which integrates the ‘control’ test, along with elements concerning the contract 
the individual is working under and the remuneration they are receiving into its 
formula. It was also established that independent contractors cannot be covered in 
vicarious liability as they are responsible for themselves. However, when we 
discussed Woodland in chapter 3 we found that the ﬂoodgates may ﬁnally have been 
opened to included independent contractors. 
Chapter 1 also went on to discuss the ‘course of employment’ element. Joel v 
Morrison established very early on that if an employee is on a ‘frolic of their own’ 
they cannot be in the course of employment and therefore the employer cannot be 
liable for their act. In Rose v Plenty it was also discussed that even if an employee 
may seem to be on a ‘frolic’, if the employer is beneﬁtting from their tortious act, as 
they were in that case, they could still be found liable. One of the tests favoured by 
the courts for establishing the course of employment was the ‘Salmond formulation’ 
– this asked two questions: was the act authorised, but done in an unauthorised 
manner? Or, was it a totally unauthorised act? The test was used by the courts for 
many years, however, as cases such as Lister have shown, the test could be seen 
only as a quick ﬁx which can leave the courts with more questions than answers. 
Hence, in Lister the Court created the new ‘close connection’ test, which asked how 
close the connection was between the tort and the job which the individual was 
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employed to do. The discussion also focused on several cases which subsequently 
went on to apply the ‘close connection’ test, which received its own adequate 
amount of praise, along with criticism. 
One of the most recent criticisms the test received was in the case of Mohamud, in 
which the claimant’s lawyers suggested a new test involving the view of the 
reasonable observer. This criticism, however, was quickly suppressed by the court, it 
was stated that there was nothing wrong with the ‘close connection’ test (Lord 
Toulson) and that even though the current law may be imprecise, cases should be 
decided individually to ensure a just outcome (Lord Dyson). Although, it was found in 
Mohamud that the scope of the test had been widened by the case, resulting in a 
possible increase in successful cases for claimants (Young). Mohamud was also 
compared the case to Vaickuviene here to ﬁnd that in cases with racial attacks such 
as these the court can have great difﬁculty in coming to a just decision (Fulbrook).
As stated, Mohamud was heard by the Supreme Court at the same time as Cox and 
jointly they established that what the court must consider when discussing the 
course of employment is not only the relationship between the claimant and the 
tortfeasor, but also the ‘ﬁeld of activities’ of the tortfeaser and the connection the ﬁeld 
had with the tort. Cox focused more on the ﬁrst element, with Mohamud focusing 
primarily on the second element, and it was found with this decision that control was 
no longer the essential element when establishing if an individual was an employee. 
Chapter 2 offered a detailed discussion of Woodland and established the current 
legal position on non-delegable duties owed by employers to third party victims. This 
was where it was found that independent contractors could now be included for 
vicarious liability if a non-delegable duty was owed. Five criteria were found in 
Woodland, with special focus on vulnerability of victims. As to avoid ﬂoodgates 
though, cases should still be decided individually (Lady Hale) and liability should only 
be imposed where it is just, fair and reasonable to do so. 
Finally, chapter 3 arrived at the present to discuss the case of Bellman, in which the 
courts were given ﬁve principles to summarise the current law of vicarious liability. 
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The key points which all judges should now consider when deciding a case are: if the 
individual is an employee or an independent contractor, if they were in the course of 
employment at the time of committing the tort and what duty the employer owes to 
the victim. Here it was also considered what could lie in the future of vicarious liability 
law – namely a vast increase in insurance costs for employers, especially if the 
predictions for more successful claims prove to be correct. 
The various justiﬁcations for the imposition of vicarious liability law were found to all 
be ﬂawed, and a collaboration of them all would appear to be the greatest one. 
However, they all seem to create more questions than they answer. At its simplest it 
could be said that it seems only fair that a victim of such an act should have some 
route of compensation for the losses or harm that they have suffered, whether that 
be through an employer or some form of government body. Perhaps if the legal area 
were one of statute, instead of common law, a fairer route of compensation could be 
created. However, this area would appear to be one better left to the judgment of the 
courts, rather than that of Parliament. 
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